Tax policy in the European Union : a review of issues and options by Cnossen, S.
  
 
Tax policy in the European Union : a review of issues
and options
Citation for published version (APA):
Cnossen, S. (2002). Tax policy in the European Union : a review of issues and options. (METEOR
research memorandum; No. 023). Maastricht: METEOR, Maastricht University School of Business and
Economics.
Document status and date:
Published: 01/01/2002
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Please check the document version of this publication:
• A submitted manuscript is the version of the article upon submission and before peer-review. There can
be important differences between the submitted version and the official published version of record.
People interested in the research are advised to contact the author for the final version of the publication,
or visit the DOI to the publisher's website.
• The final author version and the galley proof are versions of the publication after peer review.
• The final published version features the final layout of the paper including the volume, issue and page
numbers.
Link to publication
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these
rights.
• Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
• You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
• You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
If the publication is distributed under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the “Taverne” license above,
please follow below link for the End User Agreement:
www.umlib.nl/taverne-license
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at:
repository@maastrichtuniversity.nl
providing details and we will investigate your claim.
Download date: 04 Dec. 2019
1 
TAX POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
A Review of Issues and Options 
Sijbren Cnossen∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
‘Determined to lay the foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of 
Europe’, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands 
signed the Treaty of Rome in 1957 establishing the European Economic 
Community. In the course of the years, another nine countries joined the 
Community, subsequently called the European Union (EU) following the 
ratification of the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992. In 2000, the EU encompassed 
376 million people and generated a combined gross domestic product (GDP) of 
8.5 trillion euro.1 In comparison, the United States (US) had 276 million 
inhabitants in that year and its GDP was 9.2 trillion euro. Accordingly, per capita 
income in the US (adjusted to reflect purchasing power parity) is almost 50 
percent higher than that in the EU. Table 1 shows these figures as well as the 
percentage distribution of the EU’s GDP and population and the index of per 
capita income per Member State. 
As an economic union, the EU shares important features with the US, which 
is a federation.2 The economies of the EU Member States, like those of the US 
states, form a single integrated market free of restrictions on the movement of  
 
                                                                                                                                    
∗Department of Economics and Business Administration, University of Maastricht. This treatise is a revised 
version of my valedictory address at Erasmus University Rotterdam, delivered October 19, 2001. The updated 
version includes a discussion of the European Commission’s Working Paper on Company Taxation in the 
Internal Market. The address was dedicated to Richard Bird, Charles McLure and Lans Bovenberg from whom 
I learn about these things. I am also grateful for the helpful comments received from Ruud de Mooij, Richard 
Musgrave, Judith Payne and Peter Sørensen. Of course, any remaining shortcomings are my responsibility. 
1In the coming years, 10 central and eastern European countries as well as Cyprus and Malta will be admitted 
to the EU. The combined population of the accession countries is 106 million (28 percent of the EU’s 
population) and the combined GDP is 409 billion euro (4.8 percent of the EU’s GDP). 
2It should be emphasized that the objectives of the Treaty of Rome and its successor go far beyond purely 
economic considerations. In contrast to ordinary international agreements, the Treaty established its own legal 
order distinct from international law and from the internal law of the Member States. The Union has legal 
personality and enjoys extensive legal capacity in each of the Member States. The tasks entrusted to the Union 
are carried out by a Parliament, a Council (consisting of representatives of the Member States varying 
depending upon the subject matter), a Commission (required to show complete impartiality towards the Union), 
a Court of Justice and a Central Bank. The acts of these institutions are binding, as they are applicable, on the 
Member States, their citizens and other institutions. 
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TABLE 1 
European Union and United States: 
Gross Domestic Product, Population and Per Capita Income, 2000 
 GDPa Population Per capita income 
 Euro billion Million Euro 
EU 8,524.2 376.1 22,665 
US 9,161.6 275.6 33,242 
    
European Unionb Percentage distribution Index 
Germany 22.9 21.8 105 
UK 16.0 15.9 102 
France 15.8 15.6 99 
Italy 15.6 15.3 102 
 Subtotal 70.3 68.6 103 
    
Netherlands 4.9 4.2 115 
Belgium 2.9 2.7 107 
Sweden 2.4 2.4 102 
Austria 2.4 2.2 111 
Denmark 1.7 1.4 121 
Finland 1.4 1.4 103 
Ireland 1.2 1.0 119 
Luxembourg 0.2 0.1 197 
 Subtotal 17.1 15.4 112 
    
Spain  8.7 10.6 83 
Portugal 1.9 2.7 73 
Greece 1.9 2.8 69 
 Subtotal 12.5 16.1 79 
    
Grand total 100.0 100.0 100 
aGDP data have been adjusted to reflect purchasing power parities (PPPs).  
bWithin each group of Member States, ranked in decreasing order of the share of GDP in the combined GDP.  
Source: Author’s computations on the basis of data provided by Eurostat. Figures may not sum because of 
rounding. 
 
goods, obstacles to the right of establishment of businesses and employment and 
to the free movement of persons, services and capital. Recently, the economic 
union has been completed with the unification of monetary and exchange rate 
policies and the introduction of a single currency by 12 Member States. 
Furthermore, the nondiscrimination principle, closely guarded by the European 
Court of Justice, ensures that Member States cannot treat the nationals of another 
Member State, natural or juridical persons, differently from their own nationals. 
This principle extends to levels of public services and social protection within 
Member States. Although much smaller, the EU’s special funds resemble similar 
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federal–state transfer and grant programs in the US. The special funds mitigate 
the inefficiency (and inequity) that would otherwise result from the inability to 
provide adequate levels of public services by less-well-off Member States. 
In contrast to the US, however, the EU does not have a federal government 
with real taxing powers and financial leverage over the Member States to 
mitigate adverse effects that might arise from Member State tax policies.3 The 
impact of these tax systems is enormous because tax levels are very high. In 
2000, 3.6 trillion euro or 42.5 percent of the EU’s GDP was collected in the form 
of tax revenue. This is 13 percentage points higher than the US tax/GDP ratio of 
29.4 percent.  
As economic integration within the EU progresses, the interactions between 
the tax systems of the Member States are of growing importance. Member State 
tax policies can have spillover or externality effects, positive or negative, on 
other Member States. Similarly, differing abilities to provide net fiscal benefits 
to residents may impair the efficient allocation of productive factors across 
Member States. Furthermore, separate tax mechanisms increase administrative 
and compliance complexity and costs for governments and taxpayers, and 
constrain Member States in pursuing redistributive tax policies. 
These considerations have important implications for the design and 
coordination of tax systems in the EU. As background, Section II surveys tax 
developments in EU Member States and Section III reviews the criteria and 
principles that should govern the tax relationships between the Member States. 
Following, there are separate sections on the issues and options that Member 
States face when levying and coordinating their taxes on consumption (VAT and 
excises – Section IV), labor (income taxes and social security contributions – 
Section V) and capital (corporation tax, individual income tax on capital income 
and wealth taxes – Section VI). Section VII summarizes and attempts to answer 
the question of how much tax systems should be coordinated between Member 
States.  
II. TAX DEVELOPMENTS AND EQUIVALENCIES 
As background to the discussion, this section looks at the level and composition 
of tax revenue systems in the EU. Overall tax levels in the EU are much higher 
than those in the US. This reflects the high demand for income transfers through 
                                                                                                                                    
3The size of the EU’s budget is modest, amounting to 1.2 percent of the combined GDP of the Member States. 
It is funded by the EU’s ‘own resources’, i.e. contributions by the Member States, consisting of (a) customs 
duties, (b) agricultural levies, (c) 1.4 percent of the ‘common’ value added tax (VAT) base and (d) a budget-
balancing GNP-based contribution. On the expenditure side of the budget, approximately one-half is allocated 
to farm price support measures under the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). A further one-third goes into 
five structural funds, which are, in order of importance, the Regional Development Fund, the Social Fund, the 
Agriculture Fund, the Cohesion Fund and the Fisheries Fund. The remainder is used for overseas cooperation, 
research and administration. 
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the budget in most EU Member States. Consumption and labor, in particular, are 
taxed heavily. Subsequently, the broad equivalencies and differences between 
various taxes are clarified. 
1. Tax Developments 
(a) Rising Tax Ratios 
In the past 30 years, total tax revenues, including social security contributions,4 
have risen to historically unprecedented levels in all Member States, as shown in 
Figure 1. Tax revenue as a percentage of GDP – i.e. the tax ratio (revealing a 
country’s preference for the size of the public sector) – for the EU as a whole 
increased from 33.5 percent in 1970 to 42.5 percent in 2000, or at an average rate  
 
FIGURE 1 
Tax to GDP Ratios in the EU 
Source: Updated from Martinez-Mongay (2000). 
 
                                                                                                                                    
4In line with the OECD definition, this paper treats social security contributions as taxes, because they are 
usually compulsory, unrequited payments to general government. All existing programs that are financed on a 
pay-as-you-go basis bring about substantial redistribution from the rich to the poor and/or between generations.  
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of 0.8 percent per annum.5 In 2000, one in three Member States collected more 
than 45 percent of GDP in the form of tax revenue. In Greece, Portugal and 
Spain – less industrialized than most other Member States – the tax ratio was 23 
percent or less in 1970, but the rate of increase since 1970 greatly exceeded 
those of other Member States. Overall, the figures suggest that the tax ratios of 
individual Member States moved closer to the EU’s average.6 
Basically, as pointed out in the public finance literature (Musgrave, 1969), 
the reasons for the high levels of taxation must be sought on the expenditure side 
of the budget. In most Member States, there are strong ideological commitments 
to high levels of social expenditure on pensions (old-age and survivors’), health 
services, unemployment and disability compensation, and other income-
maintenance and welfare services. In 1995, net publicly mandated social 
expenditure was greater than 25 percent of GDP at factor cost in Germany, 
Belgium, Sweden and Finland (Adema, 1999).7 Most other Member States did 
not trail far behind.  
To finance the rising demand for social services, fundamental changes were 
made in the forms and methods of tax collection, which greatly lowered the 
marginal cost of public funds. On average, 85 percent of total tax revenue is 
collected not from the person who ultimately bears the tax but from employers 
through withholding at source (income tax, social security contributions) and 
from large production units (VAT, excises).8 The growth in the size of 
production and distribution establishments and their use of modern business 
accounting methods, to which the tax collection schemes can easily be attached, 
also assisted in raising taxes. In the early years, moreover, high economic growth 
rates pushed taxpayers into higher nominal income tax brackets, resulting in 
higher real tax payments. At times, this effect was exacerbated by inflation.9 
                                                                                                                                    
5Figures should be interpreted with some caution. Tax ratios for 2000 are typically ½ to over 2 percentage 
points lower than earlier tax ratios on account of revised GDP estimates (OECD, 2001). 
6The coefficient of variation (the standard deviation divided by the unweighted average, in percent) fell from 
23.6 percent in 1970 to 13.0 percent in 2000. Broadly, the ranking in terms of total tax to GDP ratio altered 
little between 1970 and 2000. 
7‘Net’ means that the social expenditure ratios are net of income taxes, social security contributions, 
consumption taxes and tax breaks for social purposes. The ‘clawback’ of these taxes exceeds 5 percent of GDP 
in Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands and Sweden, but is less than 2 percent in Germany and Belgium (Adema, 
1999). Italy holds an intermediate position. Comparable data on other Member States are not available.  
8Whether the broad withholding tax schemes and VATs are money machines that have contributed to oversized 
governments, as some people believe, is difficult to say. Some may consider the reduction of the marginal cost 
of public funds desirable in view of a price elasticity of demand for public expenditure (including education 
and healthcare) greater than one (Baumol effect). On the basis of a large cross-country study, Ebrill et al. 
(2001) conclude that there is evidence that the presence of a VAT is associated with a higher ratio of general 
tax revenue to GDP. This could also be the case with wage withholding taxes and social security contributions 
that are collected by employers. 
9For a comprehensive review of tax level and tax structure developments in the EU Member States and other 
OECD countries, see Messere (1993, 1998). 
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(b) Stable Tax Mix 
Although the total tax ratio has risen sharply, the tax mix has remained 
remarkably stable. This is evident from Table 2, which shows the share of 
individual taxes in total tax revenue (indicating a Member State’s preference for 
one tax over another) by economic category.10 Taxes on labor, nearly all 
withheld at source, contribute more than half of total tax revenue. What stands 
out, moreover, is that social security contributions by employees (one-third) and 
employers (two-thirds) are by far the single most important source of tax 
revenue. The decline in the share of taxes on consumption to about one-third is 
fully attributable to the decline in excise yields. Nowadays, fewer people smoke, 
while the real value of the (specific) alcohol excise has eroded. The averages, of 
course, conceal marked differences in patterns of change between Member 
States (OECD, 2001). Southern Member States, in particular, show a 
disproportionate rise in revenue from VAT and social security contributions. 
TABLE 2 
Tax Structure in the EU (1970–2000) and the US (2000) 
(weighted averages) 
Percent 
 EU, 
1970 
EU, 
1980 
EU, 
1990 
EU, 
2000 
US, 
2000 
Consumption 38.0 31.6 31.1 32.6 15.8 
VATa 16.1 16.3 17.9 19.3 7.4 
Excisesb 21.9 15.3 13.2 13.3 8.4 
      
Labor 48.8 56.9 55.1 52.0 52.0 
Income taxc 16.2 19.7 18.8 18.3 27.9 
Social security contributions 32.6 37.2 36.3 33.7 24.1 
      
Capital 13.2 11.5 13.8 15.4 32.2 
Corporation tax 5.3 5.1 6.5 6.5 7.9 
Income tax 2.8 2.1 3.2 3.8 15.0 
Property taxesd 5.1 4.3 4.1 5.1 9.3 
      
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
aIncluding revenues from pre-VAT consumption taxes and retail sales taxes in the US. 
bTaxes on tobacco, alcohol, petrol, motor vehicles and other specific goods and services. 
cIncluding taxes on labor income imputed to the self-employed and payroll taxes. 
dTaxes on net wealth, immovable property and property transfers. 
Sources: Updated from Martinez-Mongay (2000) and OECD (2001). 
                                                                                                                                    
10The use of economic categories computed from national accounts owes much to the pioneering work of 
Mendoza, Razin and Tesar (1994). Their classification differs from the classification in OECD Revenue 
Statistics, which shows tax collections by legal categories. This has the disadvantage that tax collections for the 
individual income tax combine taxes on labor and capital of the self-employed. For a review and critique of the 
new approach, as well as various suggestions for improvement, see Volkerink (2001).  
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(c) High Implicit Tax Rates 
Finally, Table 3 shows the implicit tax rates (tax revenues expressed as a 
percentage of the potential tax base computed from national accounts) in the 
EU.11 Relative to the tax base – i.e. wages as computed from national accounts – 
the rising implicit tax rate on labor to over 37 percent is highest, although the tax 
base itself declined relative to GDP (see the memorandum item). The implicit 
tax rate on consumption, at 25 percent, has remained stable throughout the 
period under review, although the consumption base as a percentage of GDP 
increased. The rise in the implicit tax rate on general consumption (VAT) was 
largely offset by a notable decline in the rate of tax, measured against general 
consumption, on specific goods and services (excises). Capital is taxed at an 
implicit rate of 23 percent, 14 percentage points lower than the implicit tax rate 
on labor. 
TABLE 3 
Implicit Tax Rates in the EU (1970–2000) and the US (2000) 
(weighted averages) 
Percent 
 EU, 
1970 
EU, 
1980 
EU, 
1990 
EU, 
2000 
US, 
2000 
Consumption 24.9 22.6 23.8 25.5 10.2 
VAT 10.5 11.7 13.7 15.1 4.8 
Excises 14.4 10.9 10.1 10.4 5.4 
      
Labor 25.3 32.5 35.4 37.3 24.9 
Wage tax 8.8 11.4 12.1 12.9 13.4 
Social security contributions 16.5 21.1 23.3 24.4 11.5 
      
Capital 18.5 19.3 21.0 23.3 22.7 
Corporation tax 7.4 8.5 9.5 9.7 7.1 
Income tax 4.1 3.6 5.4 6.1 7.2 
Property taxes 7.0 7.2 6.1 7.5 8.4 
      
Memorandum item      
Tax bases as percent of GDP      
Consumption 50.7 53.5 52.6 54.1 66.7 
Labor 64.3 67.4 62.7 59.5 61.5 
Capital 24.3 22.3 26.2 27.9 32.2 
Source: Updated from Martinez-Mongay (2000). 
 
                                                                                                                                    
11The potential tax bases for consumption and labor can be ascertained directly from national accounts, but 
difficulties arise in the computation of the tax base for capital. Usually, the net or gross operating surplus of the 
economy is taken as the tax base. But this national accounts item is a mixed bag of various income sources that 
are difficult to disentangle (Nicodème, 2001) 
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2. Comparison with the US 
The public sector in the US is much smaller. Net current public social 
expenditure, at less than 18 percent of GDP, is significantly lower than in most 
EU Member States (Adema, 1999). By extension, the tax ratio in the US, at 29.4 
percent in 2000 (Figure 1), is 13 percentage points lower than that in the EU.12 
The US tax ratio, moreover, has risen at a much lower rate since 1970 – on 
average 0.4 percent per annum, positioning it at the same level in 2000 as the EU 
was at in 1967 (OECD, 2001).13 Apparently, political resistance to public 
spending and heavy taxes and charges, particularly regarding income transfers, is 
stronger in the US than in the EU. In terms of tax structure (Table 2), the US 
relies much more than the EU does on taxes on individual income from wages 
and capital. Interestingly, the implicit tax rate on capital in the US (Table 3) is 
almost as high as it is in the EU, but the implicit tax rates on labor and 
consumption are much lower. 
Dwelling on the reasons for the large public sectors in the EU, political 
scientists, such as Webber and Wildavsky (1986) and Mueller (1997), argue that 
the political cultures in most Member States are characterized by the state-rules-
citizen view of the polity, relatively weak market regimes and strong egalitarian 
influences. The prominent position of the state explains the preference for 
regulation and subsidization, among others of labor (after taxing it first!). The 
weak market regime is mirrored in the concern with large economic and social 
differences. But in perspective, it is probably the pervasive rise of egalitarianism, 
with its passion for equality of condition, that best explains the continuous 
increase in the size of government and the attendant rise in the tax burden. When 
faced with the choice, EU Member States, conditioned by the unsettling effects 
of two world wars and a great depression, appear to prefer equality of result over 
equality of opportunity, even if this means that everyone receives less than under 
an alternative regime. 
3. Tax Equivalencies 
The classification, made above, of the major taxes by economic category into 
taxes on consumption, labor and capital says little about their economic or 
effective as distinct from their legal or formal incidence. Taxes on one economic 
category, moreover, can be equivalent to some combination of taxes on the other 
economic categories. An understanding of these equivalencies can be helpful in 
                                                                                                                                    
12Overall, the difference in the size of the public sectors between the EU and the US is somewhat smaller than 
indicated above, because social benefits are taxed more heavily in the EU. But if the difference in clawback 
were, say, 3 percentage points, then the difference between the tax ratios would still be 10 percentage points. 
This difference should be attributed mainly to differences in social security contributions (and expenditures). 
13In a further analysis, of course, aspects such as the extent of tax expenditures (doing things through the tax 
side rather than the expenditure side of the budget), clawing back social benefits, public borrowing and the 
effect of the underground economies have to be taken into account in evaluating the size of the public sector. 
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clarifying the issues and options that the EU Member States, separately and 
jointly, face in considering the future of their tax systems.14 
In line with the sequence of economic categories adopted above, consider the 
following identity for a closed economy: 
C ≡ Y – S ≡ W + R – I, 
where C is consumption, Y is total income, composed of labor income W and 
capital income R, and S is saving (which equals I, investment). R is the sum of 
the normal return on capital (generally, the rate of interest, adjusted for risk and 
inflation) and economic rents.15 
Any term in the identity can serve as the base for a particular comprehensive, 
uniform-rate consumption tax. C could be the tax base for a retail sales tax. Y–S 
represents the base for an individual consumption or expenditure tax that 
provides an allowance for saving.16 A tax on labor income that permits a 
deduction for pension contributions but taxes later payouts resembles such an 
individual consumption tax. This tax is found in all Member States. 
The term W+R–I represents value added, which forms the base for the 
consumption-type VAT. At business level, this value added is equivalent to the 
difference between sales and purchases in the profit and loss account, but 
calculated on a cash-flow basis – investments (including inventories) are 
expensed immediately (the tax is fully creditable against the tax on sales, to use 
VAT terminology). Thus, the VAT is equivalent not only to a tax on income net 
of saving but also to a tax on wages and business cash flow, R–I, all levied at the 
same uniform rate. The inclusion of business cash flow in the tax base 
distinguishes a consumption tax from a labor income tax.  
Over time, the revenue from a tax on business cash flow comes from two 
sources: economic rents from past and future investments, and the normal return 
on capital already in place. Thus, a consumption tax is also equivalent to a 
combination of invariant and uniform-rate taxes on labor income, economic rents 
and ‘old’ capital. The normal return on new capital, however, is not taxed. This 
distinguishes a consumption tax from an income tax, which taxes saving twice 
by expensing new investments over their lifetime. In practice, of course, the 
normal return on new capital is not taxed under the income tax if interest is 
deductible in ascertaining profits and not taxed at the level of the recipient, such 
as a tax-exempt entity. 
                                                                                                                                    
14For the following, see especially Auerbach, Frenkel and Razin (1996), who formally demonstrate, in a one-
period model, that a tax on income is equivalent to a tax on consumption and that a tax on imports is equivalent 
to a tax on exports. Furthermore, the authors show that these equivalencies carry over to a multiperiod setting, 
provided that the tax rates are constant and that the return to new savings is not taxed. 
15Usually, the entrepreneurial risk premium is considered part of the return on capital, but it can also be viewed 
as labor income. 
16For persuasive arguments in favor of the individual consumption tax, see Meade (1978) and Bradford (1986). 
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What happens to these equivalencies in an open economy can be illustrated 
by the balance-of-payments identity between current and capital account: 
X – M + E ≡ fI       or      X – M ≡ fI  – E, 
where X is exports, M is imports, E is net earnings from abroad and fI  is net 
investment abroad (E and fI  are negative if outbound flows exceed inbound 
flows). By excluding exports from the base and including imports, a VAT now 
becomes equivalent to a tax on labor income plus a tax on domestic and foreign 
capital income, net of new domestic and foreign investment. 
The equivalencies suggest that there is little theoretical basis for focusing 
nearly exclusively on the coordination of VAT and excises, as the Treaty of 
Rome does (as well as the WTO agreement). In principle, taxes on income and 
profits require coordination just as much as VAT and excises do.17  
III. PRINCIPLES AND CRITERIA FOR TAX COORDINATION 
While the US is a federation (Bundesstaat), the EU may perhaps be said to have 
the contours of a confederation (Staatenbund).18 The power to tax is the most 
important difference between these two forms of constitutional cooperation. In 
the EU, this power resides with the Member States, unlike in the US where the 
federal government has important taxing powers independent of the states.19 
Thus, the political tax setting in an interdependent EU contains elements of both 
the ‘independent nation state’ and the ‘federal system’. The three main criteria 
that may be applied to the design of tax policy in this setting are (a) jurisdiction 
(who should tax what), (b) distortion (how can this be done without interfering 
with the efficient functioning of the internal market) and (c) enforcement (how 
can EU-wide tax administration and compliance costs be minimized).  
1. Jurisdiction 
Jurisdiction is a central issue in the Treaty of Maastricht (1992). In the name of 
‘subsidiarity’, the Treaty proceeds from a presumption in favor of 
decentralization. Basically, policy functions, including taxation, should be 
exercised by the Member States, although the states are obliged to consider the 
effects of their actions on other Member States (Smith, 1993).  
                                                                                                                                    
17And perhaps more, because lack of coordination creates greater complexity and opportunities for tax 
avoidance than under VAT and excises. 
18The philosophy of political integration between a Bundesstaat and a Staatenbund is quite different. In a 
Bundesstaat, the center and the states are each, within a sphere, coordinate and independent (Wheare, 1963). In 
a Staatenbund, the center is subordinate to the states and dependent on them. 
19For a comprehensive analysis of the tax rules that apply between independent countries and between the 
constituent parts of a federation, see Musgrave (1983), McLure (2001) and Boadway (2001).  
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(a) Subsidiarity 
In taxation, subsidiarity seems to have three distinct but related dimensions.  
First and foremost, subsidiarity in an interdependent EU means that Member 
States should cooperate to establish the rules of the tax game. Basically, these 
rules should have regard to the reconciliation of competing claims to the same 
tax base. This means that the tax bases have to be agreed upon and properly 
formulated. Unambiguous definitions and practices (i.e. transparency) are 
essential.  
Secondly, and no less importantly, subsidiarity means that Member States 
should be able, in McLure’s (2001) words, ‘to control the level of revenue at the 
margin; that is, they must be able to set the level of taxes to correspond to the 
desires of voters’. 
Thirdly, the Member States should be able to operate their own tax systems, 
designed in accordance with the agreed rules, without the need for day-to-day 
cooperation with other Member States in the form of information exchange, 
cross-border audits, etc. which infringes on subsidiarity. Operational 
independence means that legal concepts and practices, as well as assessment, 
collection and appeal procedures, should remain the prerogative of the Member 
States.20  
Viewed together, these three features of subsidiarity suggest that tax 
sovereignty (as laid down in the unanimity rule for taxes) has to be ceded in 
establishing the tax entitlement rules so that tax independence can be exercised 
more fully in setting the tax rates and administering the rules. 
(b) Application to Tax Categories 
Traditionally, tax entitlement issues under consumption taxes (VAT and excises) 
have involved the choice between the destination and the origin principles. 
Under the destination principle, the revenue from consumption taxes accrues to 
the jurisdiction of final sale (a close proxy for consumption). To effect this 
principle, goods and services leaving a Member State (exports) are untaxed, and 
goods and services entering a Member State (imports) are taxed on a par with in-
state-produced goods and services. These adjustments are called border tax 
adjustments.21  
By contrast, goods and services can also be taxed on an origin basis, in the 
Member State of production. Revenue would then accrue to each state involved 
in the cross-border transaction in proportion to the value added by that state. In a 
                                                                                                                                    
20McLure (1992a) is the auctor intellectualis of the operational (or, as he calls it, administrative) independence 
principle.  
21Prior to 1993, border tax adjustments were effected through border controls administered by customs 
authorities. Subsequently, however, the adjustments were shifted to books of account. Currently, the tax on 
exports is remitted on the basis of documentary evidence and imports are implicitly taxed at the level of the 
first in-state trader because there is no credit for tax on imports. 
Sijbren Cnossen 
12 
looser sense, exports would be taxed but imports would not.22 In tax assignment 
theory, the destination principle has the benefit of the doubt, because the 
‘generalized benefits of public services – benefits that cannot be financed by 
fees, charges and taxes closely related to benefits – are more closely related to 
where people live than to where they work’ (McLure, 2001). Hence, a 
destination-based consumption tax would be preferable to an origin-based 
consumption tax. 
Taxes on labor (income taxes, social security contributions) are levied on the 
source principle (by the Member State in which the income is earned) or the 
residence principle (by the Member State in which the worker resides). On the 
basis of McLure's rule the residence principle has the benefit of the doubt. 
Generally, the choice of principle is not an issue, however, because workers 
usually live where they earn their wages. In the case of frontier and migrant 
workers, tax base allocation problems tend to be solved through bilateral tax 
agreements. A thorny jurisdictional issue is the portability of rights to retirement 
income by pensioners across Member State borders.23  
Taxes on capital income (corporation tax, individual income tax) are also 
levied on the source (territoriality) principle (by the state in which the 
investment is made) or the residence principle (by the state in which the supplier 
of capital resides). Under the source principle, the residence state exempts the 
income; under the residence principle, the source country exempts the income or 
the residence country provides a credit for the source-country tax. The source 
principle promotes equal treatment (nondiscrimination): residents and 
nonresidents face the same tax burden on an investment in a particular Member 
State. By contrast, the residence principle ensures equal treatment between 
resident individuals, regardless of where they invest. This enables residence 
states to tax in accordance with ability to pay, which promotes interpersonal 
equity within residence states. 
Currently, both principles are applied in the EU (and elsewhere). Corporate 
profits (direct investment income) are taxed at source on the philosophy that the 
source state has created the economic conditions under which real investment 
can flourish. However, dividends, interest and royalties (portfolio income) are 
taxed on a residence basis (and a source basis if remittances are subject to 
noncreditable withholding taxes).  
                                                                                                                                    
22The definition of the origin principle used here and by most economists differs from the meaning that the 
European Commission gives to it. The Commission uses the label for VAT collection in the country of supply 
(even if the revenue is transferred to the Member State of acquisition).  
23In Germany and Luxembourg, pension contributions are paid out of taxed income, but neither investment 
returns nor benefits are in principle subject to tax. In Denmark, Italy and Sweden, contributions can be paid out 
of untaxed income, but both investment returns and benefits are subject to tax. In other Member States, neither 
contributions nor investment returns are subject to tax, but benefits are. For a review of the issues, see 
European Commission (1997). 
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2. Distortion 
Distortion is central to the Treaty of Rome (1957). The founding fathers believed 
that competition should be the mechanism for allocating economic resources in 
the EU. Accordingly, equal conditions for competitors should not be distorted 
through the tax (or expenditure) system. Generally, this requires a substantial 
degree of tax coordination.  
(a) Externality Effects24 
While this seems fairly straightforward, in a broader context various next-best 
issues, such as differences in product and factor mobility and the interaction 
effects between Member State tax policies, should be taken into account. 
Member State tax policies can have spillover or externality effects, positive or 
negative, on other Member States. Positive externalities result from greater tax 
base mobility, which gives rise to tax competition. Without tax coordination, this 
will lead to an outcome in which tax rates are lower in all Member States than 
they otherwise would be. The consequences are that Member State governments 
will perceive their marginal cost of public funds to be higher than it is from a 
social point of view. Hence, they will have an incentive to undertax.25 
Differentiated rates, moreover, will involve an inefficient allocation of resources 
across the EU.  
Negative externalities (which may or may not offset the incentive effects of 
positive externalities) occur when taxes imposed by one Member State are borne 
partly by residents of other Member States through, say, the exportation of a tax 
on natural resources. The effect of tax exporting is the opposite of tax 
competition. Member States now have an incentive to overtax.26 While tax 
competition decreases with the size of the Member State, tax exporting increases 
with size. Generally, competition in product and factor markets mitigates 
negative externalities.  
Another source of inefficiency arises in the allocation of productive factors 
across Member States because the abilities of governments to provide net fiscal 
benefits (the difference between the monetary value of public goods and services 
obtained and the tax paid to the state) for their residents differ (Mieszkowski and 
Musgrave, 1999).27 These net benefits tend to be negative for high-income 
persons and positive for lower-income persons, but the benefits will be 
systematically higher in better-off states for taxpayers of a given income. 
                                                                                                                                    
24This subsection draws on Boadway (2001). 
25The effect is greater for small Member States, since their perceived elasticity of tax base due to mobility will 
be higher. Accordingly, small Member States will exploit large Member States by setting lower tax rates 
(Kanbur and Keen, 1993). 
26In the EU, tax exporting is permitted, but in-state customers have to be charged the same price for, say, 
natural gas as out-of-state customers. 
27This argument assumes that taxes are not benefit-based. 
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Accordingly, relocation takes place on the basis of fiscal rather than economic 
considerations. 
Whether tax competition is a bad or a good thing is to some extent in the eye 
of the beholder. Although tax competition skews tax structures in favor of more 
mobile bases and causes governments to provide lower levels of public goods 
than they otherwise would, it can serve as a discipline on the ‘profligacy of 
Princes’ (Adam Smith, 1776) and present-day governments (Edwards and Keen, 
1996). Furthermore, some tax bases are more mobile ex ante than ex post. If so, 
the familiar hold-up problem applies, i.e. once assets are in place, governments 
treat the assets as fixed and levy a high tax rate on them. Tax competition 
mitigates this problem (Kehoe, 1989).  
(b) Application to Tax Categories 
The application of the destination principle to consumption taxes does not affect 
relative prices between in-state- and out-of-state-produced goods and services. 
Early on, however, it was thought that the destination principle required border 
controls to effect border tax adjustments. Hence, it was proposed that the EU 
should shift to the origin principle, under which these controls were not thought 
to be required (Shibata, 1967). In the absence of factor flows, this would not 
have distortionary consequences. After all, the equivalence theorem (Tinbergen 
Committee, 1953) postulates that it makes no difference to real trade and 
investment which principle is applied, nor whether one principle is substituted 
for the other. Since imports are exchanged for exports, a tax on exports is 
equivalent to a tax on imports. In the event of a change from one principle to the 
other, compensating domestic price movements (or exchange rates) would ensure 
that real trade and investment are not affected. 
However, the conditions for the equivalence to hold are very severe. Thus, 
the VAT must be truly comprehensive and the tax rate uniform.28 Such a tax has 
no real-world counterpart. In practice, therefore, tax base and rate differences 
tend to distort producer and consumer choices within and between Member 
States.29 Specifically, non-comprehensive destination-based taxes tend to distort 
consumer markets, because producers can buy their inputs free of tax (which 
promotes production efficiency). Similarly, non-comprehensive origin-based 
taxes tend to distort producer markets, because consumers can buy free of tax 
                                                                                                                                    
28Furthermore, trade must be balanced initially. Even if these conditions are met, there would still be 
intergenerational wealth effects (Bovenberg, 1994). For recent studies exploring the equivalence conditions, see 
Lockwood, de Meza and Myles (1994) and Genser (1996). 
29Obviously, health, safety and other product standards as well as subsidies can have the same distortionary 
effects as taxes. Moreover, as the equivalencies in the previous section suggest, a distortionary tax on goods 
and services can be replicated by a product-sector-differentiated profits tax.  
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(which promotes exchange efficiency).30 In considering the choice of principle in 
this situation, Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) have shown that the pursuit of 
production efficiency as a policy objective takes precedence over the pursuit of 
exchange efficiency. Accordingly, the destination principle is to be preferred. 
The equivalence theorem cannot be applied to the excises. Differentiated 
rates violate exchange efficiency and may involve substantial trade diversion, 
particularly between neighboring Member States. Hence, tax competition is a 
problem for high-taxed, low-volume goods, such as tobacco, alcohol and 
petroleum products.31  
As in the case of the VAT, tax competition is not much of an issue for taxes 
on labor.32 Employees do not easily migrate to Member States with lower income 
taxes and social security contributions. Language is a formidable barrier, and 
virtually the only labor migration in the EU – very little – occurs between 
Member States that speak the same tongue. Generally, high-skilled labor is more 
mobile than low-skilled labor, but the difference is not significant. The 
(detrimental) efficiency effects of labor taxes manifest themselves mainly 
through higher product costs and lower work effort (if the substitution effect 
outweighs the income effect), but these costs tend to be borne mainly by the 
Member States themselves.  
Although resident and nonresident investors face the same capital income tax 
burden under the source principle (capital import neutrality), the principle 
violates production efficiency, because pre-tax capital costs would differ 
between Member States if rates differ.33 The residence principle, in contrast, 
promotes production efficiency because all firms face the same (reduction in the) 
pre-tax required rate of return (capital export neutrality), provided tax credits are 
not limited to the home-country tax and there is no deferral. Exchange efficiency 
would suffer, however, because savers would face different (reductions in) post-
tax returns. Nevertheless, most economists agree that residence-based taxation is 
superior to source-based taxation, because users of capital (business firms) are 
                                                                                                                                    
30Production efficiency is achieved when all firms face the same input prices (including the cost of capital) and 
all face the same price of output. Exchange efficiency is achieved when all consumers face the same product 
prices. 
31This does not apply to motor vehicle taxes, which can be tied to taxpayers’ residences. 
32The economic equivalence of labor income taxes with consumption taxes deserves to be emphasized. As 
argued above, the incidence of consumption taxes is on labor. Similarly, labor income taxes are likely to be 
largely borne by workers, because the elasticity of demand for labor is considerably greater than the elasticity 
of supply.  
33Drawing on trade theory, Slemrod (1995) argues that there is a close analogy between trade taxes and income 
taxes. Source-based income taxes, such as the corporation tax and withholding taxes on remittances, are akin to 
tariffs on inbound capital. These tariffs permit capital-importing countries to engage in ‘ownership 
protectionism’ similar to ‘border protectionism’ made possible by trade taxes. Residence-based taxes do not 
have this problem. 
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more sensitive to tax-induced differences in return than suppliers of capital 
(savers).34  
Tax competition is a serious problem under capital income taxation. Capital, 
particularly financial capital, is highly mobile. If the supply of capital at a given 
rate of return is perfectly elastic, then the tax on domestic capital income cannot 
be increased by so much that the after-tax rate of return on such income rises 
above the rate in other countries.35 Capital owners would simply move their 
capital to those other countries (unless country-specific rents exist). Also, it is 
difficult to pass the capital income tax on in product prices that are determined 
on world markets. Thus, in the long run, taxes on capital at rates higher than 
those prevailing elsewhere must be borne by suppliers of relatively immobile 
factors, e.g. labor and land.  
3. Enforcement 
The problem of enforcement is important in its own right. Agreements on the 
issues of distortion and jurisdiction come to naught if they cannot be 
implemented properly in a manner that enhances the mutual trust of Member 
States. 
Under consumption taxes, the origin principle is more difficult to administer 
than the destination principle because it involves transfer pricing issues 
(Cnossen, 1983). If exports are taxed and imports are not taxed, business firms in 
high-tax states have an incentive to undervalue sales to out-of-state affiliates and 
to overvalue purchases from out-of-state affiliates.36 Also, under a tax-credit type 
of VAT, some notional tax credit would have to be attached to imports to 
prevent them from being taxed in in-state stages of production or distribution. 
The enforcement of taxes on labor income is not much of a problem. 
Generally, these taxes are withheld at source by employers in the residence state 
of workers. 
The source principle and the residence principle are both difficult to enforce 
under taxes on capital income. The source principle requires separate accounting 
per Member State on an arm’s-length basis. Theoretically, this is impossible to 
implement between related corporations; hence various ad hoc and therefore 
contentious arrangements must be made. Differences in tax rates, moreover, 
provide an incentive to business firms to shift profits by manipulating transfer 
                                                                                                                                    
34Horst (1980) has shown that if the elasticities of supply and demand for capital are positive but finite, the 
optimal tax lies somewhere between the point that ensures capital export neutrality and the point that conforms 
to capital import neutrality. For a comprehensive review of the studies on the choice between the residence and 
source principles, see US Department of the Treasury (2001, ch. 3). 
35Exceptionally, large countries can export part of capital income taxes, because their capital flows are large 
enough to affect the rate of return in smaller countries. The large-country phenomenon would also apply to the 
EU as a whole. 
36Note that transfer pricing issues would arise even if rates were uniform across the EU, because governments 
would still be interested in taxing as much of the base originating in their state as possible. 
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prices (prices charged to or by out-of-state affiliated corporations) and by using 
excessive debt finance (thin capitalization), because interest is deductible in 
ascertaining taxable profits and may not be taxed at the level of the (nonresident) 
recipient. The implementation of the residence principle faces even greater 
technical, legal and political difficulties (Keen, 1993; Tanzi, 1995). Profits 
would have to be taxed on a current basis with full credit for taxes paid 
elsewhere. This makes residence states hostage to the taxes levied by source 
states.  
4. Conclusions 
This brief review of the tax principles and criteria that should guide tax 
coordination within the EU clearly shows that trade-offs must be made. While 
tax subsidiarity generally requires that each Member State should be permitted 
as much tax independence as is commensurate with the goals of free trade and 
free competition, fiscal neutrality, on the other hand, implies a substantial degree 
of tax coordination.37 So does tax enforcement.  
Few trade-offs have to be made under VATs levied under the destination 
principle. This principle promotes subsidiarity (rate differences can be 
accommodated if the tax base has been agreed to), production efficiency and 
enforcement. Excises need to be more closely coordinated if trade is not to be 
diverted to low-tax Member States. Coordination, however, violates the 
subsidiarity requirement. Taxes on labor income involve few jurisdictional and 
externality problems. Perhaps most problems arise in the taxation of capital 
income, which is highly mobile. The dilemma is best summed up by Slemrod 
(1995a), who believes that ‘although it is not desirable to tax capital income on a 
source basis [because source-based taxes are distortionary], it is not 
administratively feasible to tax capital on a residence basis’. 
The principles and criteria developed above form the basis for a closer 
evaluation of the taxes on consumption, labor and capital in the following 
sections. 
IV. TAXES ON CONSUMPTION 
The founding fathers of the European Economic Community, the EU’s 
predecessor, believed that the elimination of import duties, completed on 
                                                                                                                                    
37See Cnossen (1990). Although interacting, distortion and jurisdiction are distinct problems. Distortion would 
still arise if all the revenues from different tax systems were collected by one EU-wide tax administration. 
Jurisdiction would still be an issue if tax structures and rates were the same in all Member States, because the 
various taxing authorities would still compete for revenue. 
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January 1, 1968,38 would not be sufficient to achieve the goals of free movement 
of goods and services and undistorted competition if cascade-type turnover taxes 
(levied in five out of the six original Member States) and excises were allowed 
to function as trade barriers instead.39 The European Commission set up by the 
Treaty of Rome was instructed, therefore, to formulate proposals for the 
harmonization of these taxes in the interest of the Common Market.40 This led to 
the EU-wide introduction of the VAT. Subsequently, the adoption of the VAT 
became a nonnegotiable condition for membership. By contrast, harmonization 
proposals for the excises have made little or no progress. 
1. Value Added Taxes 
In 1977, the base and workings of the VATs in the EU were substantially 
harmonized through the adoption of the Sixth Directive (Directive 77/388/EEC). 
Subsequently, with the abolition of border controls in 1992, a transitional regime 
(in the absence of some definitive regime) or deferred payment system was 
introduced, dealing with the treatment of intra-EU supplies (exports) and 
acquisitions (imports) (Directive 91/680/EEC). In conjunction with the new 
regime, a VAT Information Exchange System (VIES) was set up to monitor the 
VAT on the supply and acquisition of goods (not services) from other Member 
States. Finally, rate approximation (a minimum standard rate of 15 percent and a 
minimum reduced rate of 5 percent) was agreed upon to reduce perceived cross-
border-shopping incentives following the removal of border controls (Directive 
92/77/EEC). 
Against this background and a survey of current VATs in the EU, the 
following questions come to mind. Has the Sixth Directive, promulgated 25 
years ago, withstood the ravages of time, particularly as regards the 
                                                                                                                                    
38In addition, various nontariff barriers having equivalent effect had to be removed. Examples are different 
product regulations and standards for health or safety reasons or for environmental or consumer protection. 
Most of these barriers lingered until 1992. 
39Cascade-type turnover taxes were levied on sales every time a product changed hands, without regard to the 
tax levied in previous stages of production and distribution. Hence, these taxes became cumulative and 
capricious in their effects on prices and they induced firms to integrate. More importantly, refunds upon export 
could not be calculated precisely and nor could compensating taxes on imports. By implication, the refund and 
compensating tax mechanisms (border tax adjustments) could be used for protectionist purposes. 
40Article 95 (old) of the Treaty of Rome prescribes that ‘no Member State shall impose, directly or indirectly, 
on the products of other Member States any internal taxation of any kind in excess of that imposed directly or 
indirectly on similar domestic products’. Article 99 (old) therefore placed a mandatory call upon the European 
Commission to formulate proposals for the harmonization of sales taxes and excises in the interest of the 
Common Market. In the early 1960s, the Commission set up two committees (Neumark Committee, 1963; 
Jansen Committee, 1963), which both recommended the EU-wide adoption of the VAT already in place in 
France and under active consideration in Germany. 
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exemptions?41 How strong is the case for dual- or multiple-rate VATs? What 
should be the shape of the definitive regime for the coordination of the VATs 
between the Member States? Is cross-border shopping a problem of such 
magnitude that it requires agreement on a common maximum and minimum rate? 
(a) Survey of VATs 
Table 4 shows the VATs in the 15 Member States, arranged by type of rate 
structure: predominantly single-, dual- or multiple-rate VATs. All Member 
States bar Denmark impose one or more reduced rates on items regarded as 
essential, such as food products, medicines, books, newspapers and passenger 
transportation. The UK and Ireland even zero-rate these (and various other) 
items. The coverage of the reduced rates ranges from 20 percent (Germany) to 
40 percent (UK) of total consumption expenditures.42 Standard rates range from 
15 percent in Luxembourg to 25 percent in Denmark and Sweden. 
The high rates in conjunction with the broad base have made the VAT an 
important revenue-generator in all Member States (comparable to the wage and 
social security withholding tax schemes). In 1999, the VATs contributed, on 
average, 18.1 percent of total tax revenue (inclusive of social security 
contributions) or 7.4 percent of GDP (Table 4). Since the VAT was introduced, 
the average standard rate has increased from 13.9 percent to 19.4 percent at 
present – by almost 40 percent.43 On average, the VAT ratios – i.e. VAT revenue 
as a percentage of GDP – are one-and-a-half times the ratios for the predecessor 
sales taxes.44 In the UK, the VAT ratio now is three times higher than the ratio 
for the erstwhile purchase tax. No doubt, the revenue-generating capacity of the 
VAT owes much to its inherent robustness45 and low excess burden.46 Although  
 
                                                                                                                                    
41In addition, as the European Commission (1996a) has pointed out, various concepts, such as the place of 
supply rules, require review. However, legal issues, important in their own right, are not dealt with in this 
paper.  
42These figures are based on Cnossen (1983, table 7.2). Although dated, the shares of the reduced rates in total 
consumption are likely to have changed relatively little in view of the largely harmonized coverage of the 
reduced rates under the Sixth Directive. 
43Increases of 5 percentage points or more were recorded in Denmark, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Luxembourg and the UK. 
44Thus, the average increase in revenue as a percentage of GDP is greater than the average increase in standard 
VAT rates. This is due to improved administration and the expanded coverage of the standard-rate category. In 
many Member States, important items, such as fuels, were moved from the lower- to the standard-rate category. 
45The VAT is administratively and politically robust because it pays to be a taxable person (except where 
exemption occurs at the last stage). As Ben Terra once noted, fundamentally, those that are taxed are exempt 
and those that are exempt are taxed. By implication, political tinkering with the tax base in response to special-
interest groups is discouraged. 
46The major distortion under a comprehensive uniform-rate VAT pertains to the labor–leisure choice. 
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TABLE 4 
VATs in EU Member States, 2002 
 VAT rates (%)a VAT revenue as percent of:  
 Standard Otherb Total tax 
revenue 
GDP 
 Single-rate VATs     
 Denmark 25 —c 19.2 9.7 
     
 Dual-rate VATs     
 Austria 20 10d 19.0 8.4 
 Germany 16 7 18.4 6.9 
 Netherlands 19 6 16.9 7.1 
 UK 17.5 0e 18.8 6.8 
     
 Multiple-rate VATs     
 Belgium 21 6 / 12f 16.0 7.3 
 Finland 22 8 / 17g 18.8 8.7 
 France 19.6 2.1 / 5.5 17.3 8.0 
 Greece 18 4 / 8 21.7 8.0 
 Ireland 20 0 / 12.5h 22.0 7.1 
 Luxembourg 15 3 / 6 / 12 15.0 6.3 
 Italy 20 4 / 10i 13.7 5.9 
 Portugal 17 5 / 12 23.7 8.1 
 Spain 16 4 / 7 17.5 6.1 
 Sweden 25 6 / 12j 13.8 7.2 
     
 Unweighted averages 19.4  18.1 7.4 
aRates are in tax-exclusive form, i.e. specified as a proportion of the net-of-tax price. 
bNot including the zero rate on exports. 
cNewspapers are taxed at 0 percent. 
dWine supplied by farmers and electrically driven vehicles are taxed at 12 percent.  
eCertain ‘energy-saving materials’ are taxed at 5 percent. An effective rate of 5 percent is also applied to some 
imported works of art, collector’s items and antiques.  
fNewspapers, magazines and waste products are taxed at 0 percent 
gNewspapers and magazines are taxed at 0 percent. 
hLivestock and greyhounds are taxed at 4.3 percent. 
iWaste paper and scrap iron are taxed at 0 percent. 
jPrescribed medicines are taxed at 0 percent. 
Sources: Rates – International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation, Value Added Taxes in Europe, Amsterdam, 
loose-leaf; revenues (1999) – OECD (2001). Reduced rates apply to supplies in Jungholz and Mittelberg 
(Austria), the Aegean Islands (Greece), Corsica (France) and the Autonomous Regions (Portugal). 
 
VAT’s operational costs are not negligible, per euro of revenue they are 
substantially lower than those of a business income tax.47 
                                                                                                                                    
47For the evidence, see Cnossen (1994), who estimates the administrative costs of a ‘best-practice’ VAT at 
US$100 per taxable business per annum. Administrative costs vary widely between Member States, depending 
on the complexity of the VAT as reflected in factors such as the number of rates, the size of the threshold, 
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(b) VAT Exemptions 
Efficiency in production and tax collection is best served if the VAT is imposed 
on the widest possible range of goods and services that are used or consumed by 
businesses and individuals. Exemptions violate the logic and functionality of the 
VAT. They distort input choices and harm exports. It is widely agreed that 
exemptions should be limited to those dictated by strict administrative cost–
benefit considerations. If externalities are prevalent, zero-rating rather than 
exemption is the appropriate recipe. The Sixth Directive fails to meet this 
standard. 
Standard Exemptions 
The standard exemptions under the Sixth Directive include healthcare, 
education, social services, cultural services, public radio and television 
broadcasts, postal services, immovable property, insurance, financial 
transactions and gambling. Most of these exemptions are in conflict with ‘best 
practice’. 
Cultural Services 
The case against the exemption of cultural services is particularly strong. 
Admissions to theatres, concerts, museums and the like compete with taxable 
forms of entertainment, such as travel and reading, and should therefore be 
taxed. Similarly, public radio and television broadcasts compete with taxable 
privately financed broadcasts and other forms of communication. This applies 
also to postal services (which compete with taxable private letter or parcel 
carriers), newspapers and periodicals. Since it is difficult to justify these 
exemptions on externality grounds, withdrawal seems indicated. Various 
Member States are coming around to this view. For instance, cultural services 
are now being taxed in Finland, Greece, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden; 
radio and television broadcasting in Denmark; and postal services in Finland and 
Sweden. 
Health and Education 
Even the exemptions for healthcare and education services hardly stand up to 
close scrutiny. Admittedly, the externality arguments are much stronger than in 
                                                                                                                                    
various special schemes and (lack of) compliance control jointly with the business income tax. Of the Member 
States surveyed, administrative costs were lowest in Sweden (US$68) and highest in the UK (US$200). 
Furthermore, Cnossen estimates compliance costs at US$500 per taxable business per annum, again with wide 
differences between Member States. Compliance costs per US$1,000 turnover in the UK, for instance, were six 
times the compliance costs in Germany. In spite of the relatively high threshold in the UK (and Ireland), small 
traders register anyway to obtain refunds of the tax on purchases (and other inputs) of zero-rated foodstuffs and 
various other items. 
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the case of cultural services, but if health and education services should be 
provided below cost, then (an increase in) budget subsidies (or a zero rate) 
would be the appropriate policy response. The exemptions violate production 
efficiency because the institutions providing healthcare and education services 
are induced to perform laundry, cleaning, food preparation and various other 
services in-house in order to save the payment of VAT on the labor element of 
these services, which would be payable had they been acquired from outside, 
taxable establishments. This hampers the contracting-out of these services 
(privatization) and thus the efficient functioning of the institutions. Exemption 
also raises the research cost for companies wishing to conduct research through 
hospitals and universities, because they cannot take implicit credit for the tax on 
the inputs used by the exempt institutions. These considerations become more 
important as the private provision of healthcare and education grows relative to 
public provision, as is happening in the EU. Taxing health (and cultural) services 
would most likely shift the tax burden to the richer elderly. 
Immovable Property 
It is difficult, politically and administratively, to tax residential rents and rental 
values of owner-occupied property.48 Instead, new buildings are taxed and 
subsequent sales exempted. This seems an acceptable second-best solution, 
because, in theory, the tax on a new building equals the present value of the tax 
on all future services, reflected in residential rents and rental values, of the 
building. However, under the Sixth Directive, the exemption also extends to 
commercial property, which means that increases in the value of the property, 
and hence in the services provided by the property, are not included in the tax 
base. This violates production efficiency. The Member States should be advised, 
therefore, to tax all supplies of immovable property except residential housing, 
rather than to exempt all supplies except new buildings. 
Financial Services 
Administratively beyond reach so far are financial transactions, because the 
intermediation charge, which should be taxed, cannot be separated from the pure 
interest rate, premium or rate of return, which should not be taxed.49 The 
exemption also compromises the destination principle, because some VAT enters 
into the export cost of financial services and thus becomes a tax on factor 
                                                                                                                                    
48Austria is the only Member State that taxes the letting of private housing, which therefore does not have to be 
delineated from hotels and boarding houses. For a review of the theory and practice of the VAT treatment of 
immovable property, see Cnossen (1996). 
49The same issue arises under insurance contracts with a saving feature. If contracts do not have a saving 
feature, insurance can be taxed like any other product. New Zealand, for instance, taxes fire and casualty 
insurance by levying VAT on the premiums and permitting a tax credit on indemnity payments. 
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incomes.50 Furthermore, various administrative complications arise. Taxable 
‘secondary services’ (accounting and tax advice, for instance) must be delineated 
from exempt ‘core services’ and the input tax apportioned accordingly. Optional 
registration in France and Germany does not seem to offer a viable solution. Nor 
do zero-rating and addition and subtraction methods.51 
Perhaps the cash-flow approach, pioneered by Poddar and English (1997), 
deserves further scrutiny. Under the cash-flow approach, cash inflows from 
financial transactions (deposits, interest receipts) are treated as taxable sales, and 
cash outflows (loans, interest payments) are treated as purchases of taxable 
inputs. The VAT on these inputs, along with the VAT on inputs of nonfinancial 
goods and services, would be creditable against the VAT on outputs. The VAT 
on outputs, in turn, would constitute input tax credits for other taxable persons. 
(At the same time, of course, these taxable persons would pay VAT on their 
inflows, e.g. loans extended by banks.) As a result, tax cascading, inherent to the 
exemption approach, would be avoided, while consumers would be taxed in full. 
The cash-flow method can be made compatible with the destination principle, 
simply by ignoring the provision of financial services to or from nonresidents. 
The EU (European Commission, undated) has closely considered Poddar and 
English’s ingenious idea, but doubts remain about its practicability. ‘Trying to 
get to grips with banking … is akin to trying to get your hands around a piece of 
jelly,’ as Tait (1991) puts it succinctly.52 
Treatment of Specified Activities 
In addition to the standard exemptions, the Sixth Directive exempts specified 
activities of public sector bodies, small businesses and farmers. 
Public Bodies 
Early on, it was considered odd if government would pay VAT to itself on the 
services it provided. So, activities performed by public authorities were 
exempted unless treatment as a nontaxable person ‘would lead to significant 
distortions of competition.’ But nowadays, it is widely agreed that there are few 
government services that cannot be provided by the private sector.53 The 
distortion of input prices violates the conditions for cost minimization – the 
                                                                                                                                    
50More generally, Feldstein and Krugman (1990) have argued that exemptions from VAT usually fall on 
nontradable rather than tradable goods and services. Hence, VAT exemptions discourage trade and raise the 
production and consumption of nontradables. 
51For a review of the exemption approach, optional registration, zero-rating and addition and subtraction 
methods, see Cnossen (1999a). 
52As pointed out by Bradford (1996), the problems that bedevil the VAT treatment of financial services are 
very similar to the problems with the treatment of financial services under the income tax. 
53The exemption of public bodies, moreover, has little meaning if legal restrictions, pricing-cum-subsidy 
schemes or the status of public monopoly in effect preclude competition by the private sector. 
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counterpart of profit maximization in the private sector. This is particularly true 
for local and provincial or state governments.54 Recently, Aujean, Jenkins and 
Poddar (1999) have made a cogent case for the wider taxation of public bodies. 
As with hospitals, universities and financial institutions, this would obviate the 
need for delineation between taxable and exempt government activities as well 
as for special charging provisions if taxable goods and services are acquired out-
of-state.55  
Small Businesses 
Since compliance costs are largely fixed costs independent of the VAT payable, 
they fall especially heavily on small traders. The compliance costs of small 
traders (with turnover below 60,000 euro) are of the order of 2 percent of 
turnover, but costs are merely 0.3 percent for larger firms (with turnover above 
1 million euro).56 In competitive markets, the higher compliance costs of small 
traders generally cannot be passed on to consumers. In other words, they tend to 
reduce the disposable income of the small traders themselves.57 Prima facie, 
compliance costs can be reduced by increasing the small-business exemption, 
which is now 5,000 euro of annual turnover. The issue features as a ‘potential 
future priority’ in the Commission’s VAT action program. 
The VAT is also onerous for small businesses on account of various 
exceedingly complex schemes to make small firms pay some tax. These schemes 
range from the equalization tax on supplies to exempt small retailers in Spain; 
the vanishing tax reduction for small businesses related either to net tax payable 
or to turnover found in Finland, France, Luxembourg and the Netherlands; the 
presumptive tax schemes (based on business surveys) applied by tax offices in 
Belgium, France, Italy and Spain; to the application of flat tax rates to the 
turnover of small firms in lieu of an exact computation of the tax liability in 
Germany and Italy. These schemes add greatly to administrative and compliance 
costs without contributing much to revenue. Experience in new-VAT countries 
indicates that the simplest small-firm scheme is a fairly generous exemption 
without any strings attached. Austria adopted this approach in 1989 by 
abolishing all simplified schemes for small businesses. 
                                                                                                                                    
54To avoid this effect, Luxembourg, France, the Netherlands and the UK refund the tax on inputs of local 
governments, in effect zero-rating their activities. This eliminates both the distortion of input choices and the 
bias against contracting-out. 
55Essentially the same issues arise regarding exempt nonprofit bodies. 
56See especially Sandford, Godwin and Hardwick (1989). 
57Assuming a profit margin of 35 percent, the higher compliance costs of 1.7 percentage points of turnover are 
equivalent to a 5 percent flat, regressive income tax. 
Tax Policy in the European Union 
25 
Agriculture 
Finally, the Sixth Directive permits the taxation of farmers on the basis of flat-
rate schemes that compensate them for the tax borne on agricultural inputs. This 
tax is estimated as a presumptive percentage of farm output. Farmers can then 
add the tax to their bills of sale (and be taxed at the same rate) or purchasers of 
farm produce can directly take a credit for the presumptive tax. In either case, 
farmers do not have to register for or pay the VAT. Obviously, the schemes 
provide only rough justice and, just like the old turnover tax, can be used to 
subsidize farmers. Best practice would be to make farmers fully liable for VAT, 
subject to the small-business exemption. This is already being done in Denmark, 
Sweden and the UK. 
Conclusion 
Invariably, the exemptions and special schemes violate production and tax 
collection efficiency, as well as complicating compliance and administration.58 
Newcomers to the VAT, such as Australia, Canada and New Zealand, have 
followed best practice by taxing or zero-rating nearly all of the exempt services 
listed above.59 Generally, primary and secondary education and financial 
transactions are the only exceptions. Zero-rating may be the best choice, since it 
avoids an artificial but politically sore point of an increase in the VAT ratio 
(compensated by an increase in subsidies). Similarly, there is a strong case for 
reviewing the treatment of government activities, farmers and small businesses. 
In short, a comprehensive overhaul of the Sixth Directive seems called for. But 
under the Treaty of Rome this requires unanimity, which is hard to come by. If 
the EU Member States are not to be locked into outmoded VATs, perhaps they 
should be permitted to have better VATs than provided by the Sixth Directive.60 
As a result, intra-EU trade probably would be less distorted than is the case 
under current VATs. 
(c) Single- or Differentiated-Rate VATs? 
The rationale for most exemptions must be found in the history of the adoption 
of the various VATs, not in their underlying economic or administrative logic. 
This is also true of the dual- and multiple-rate structures shown in Table 4. So-
                                                                                                                                    
58The existence of exempt sectors is sometimes used as an argument in favor of rate harmonization, because it 
would reduce distortions between tradable-goods sectors that use the goods of tax-exempt producers as inputs, 
as well as between exempt sectors that produce tradable goods (Bovenberg and Horne, 1992). Clearly, however, 
taxation would seem to be the preferred approach to eliminate distortions. 
59New Zealand taxes healthcare and education in full, Australia zero-rates these services, while Canada does 
not tax the services and provides a rebate of 50 percent of the tax on inputs to the MUSH sector 
(municipalities, universities, schools and hospitals). 
60This need not affect the determination of the VAT contribution to the EU’s ‘own resources’. 
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called essential goods were taxed at reduced rates under predecessor sales taxes, 
so it seemed logical to continue the same treatment under the VAT.  
In the mean time, it has become clear that reduced rates hardly mitigate the 
regressive burden distribution of the VAT measured against income. As early as 
1988, the OECD concluded that it made little difference to the tax burden 
distribution whether food products were zero-rated (the UK), taxed at a reduced 
rate (the Netherlands) or even taxed at the same rate as other goods and services 
(Denmark).61 Tax-relevant differences in consumption patterns have largely 
disappeared in highly industrialized countries. Higher-income groups often buy 
varieties of particular commodities that are more expensive than the varieties 
bought by lower-income groups, but rate structures based on prices rather than 
commodities are not feasible.62 The rich also spend proportionately more than 
the poor on holidays abroad and on education, but these expenditures either 
cannot be taxed or are excluded on social grounds. 
In short, differentiated VAT rates are an ineffective, ill-targeted instrument 
for eliminating the impact of the tax on the poor. Member States have available 
tax and income-support measures that are much better than a VAT for bringing 
the overall tax impact distribution in line with society’s notions of ability to pay 
and income redistribution. Hemming and Kay (1981), for instance, find that 
there would be little change in the UK tax system’s overall progressivity if zero-
rating were abolished and the increase in revenue were used to cut one point 
from the basic rate of income tax and to increase the tax threshold. An income 
tax is more sensitive than a VAT to the economic position and the personal 
circumstance of individual taxpayers. So is the social benefit system for people 
who do not pay income tax. 
Furthermore, differentiated VAT rate structures are an administrative pain in 
the neck. They complicate the taxpayer’s accounting system, require additional 
audit oversight, increase refunds, give rise to various definitional problems63 and 
                                                                                                                                    
61Elsewhere, a New Zealand study (Australian Society of CPAs, 1998) indicates that merely 15 percent of the 
benefit of a zero rate on food would go to households with the lowest 20 percent of income. Similarly, 
computations by the US Congressional Budget Office (1992) show that a zero rate on food would reduce the 
regressivity of a hypothetical VAT by only 18 percent. For a recent review, see Cnossen (1999). 
62As noted by the Irish Commission on Taxation (1984, appendix 9), the perverse effect of the Irish zero rate on 
food is that, in absolute terms, it gives twice as much relief to high-income groups as to low-income groups. 
Not only do the rich tend to buy more expensive varieties of food, but also they eat out more often and may be 
more inclined to throw food away. In the same vein, a Swedish study (Skall Matmomsen Slopas? 1983) 
concludes that the application of a zero rate on groceries would mainly benefit cohabiting yuppies – single 
people with higher incomes. 
63Perhaps most telling in this connection is the admonition found in the loose-leaf edition of the International 
Bureau of Fiscal Documentation’s Value Added Taxes in Europe regarding France’s VAT rate structure: 
The application of the reduced rate of 5.5% is very complex. It applies to a great number of goods and 
services whose technical description generally falls outside the scope of this book. The application of 
the reduced rate is sometimes also dependent on the circumstances in which the transaction was 
effected. The tax authorities have issued a number of rulings in order to solve particular difficult 
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invite misclassification. In the UK, firms with multiple-rate output have double 
the compliance costs of firms taxed at a single rate (Hemming and Kay, 1981).64 
Agha and Haughton (1996) find that by adding another VAT rate, the 
compliance rate is reduced by 7 percentage points. Differential rates may also 
erode the tax base. Typically national preferences inexplicably appear to be 
especially deserving.65 
In short, differentiated rate structures do not pass the litmus test.66 In all EU 
Member States, the income taxes and social benefit systems are much-better-
targeted instruments to mitigate the regressive impact of the VAT. Yet, dual 
rates are probably here to stay, because concessionary treatment, once extended, 
is politically difficult to withdraw.67 What could be done in any case is to 
streamline the coverage of the reduced rates. Luxembourg, the Netherlands and 
Spain, for instance, expanded the coverage of the reduced rate to all food for 
human and animal consumption whether consumed on or off the premises. In 
doing so, they abolished all differentiation within the category foodstuffs 
between essential and nonessential items (which makes even less sense than the 
differentiation between all foodstuffs and other products). By contrast, Austria 
and Germany, while taxing most food products at the reduced rate, apply the 
standard rate to seafood. 
                                                                                                                                    
questions. The following discussion, therefore, gives only an indication of the cases in which the 
reduced rate applies. 
64Perhaps the UK’s VAT is not far behind in matching the complexity of France’s VAT. For instance, the 
following factors have to be considered in applying the zero rate to food: place of consumption, timing of 
consumption, temperature, saltiness, number, volume, concentration, sugar content, use of fingers in 
consumption and alcoholic content. 
65In Belgium, for instance, soap is taxed at the lower rate of 6 percent (one smells the difference); in Ireland, a 
zero rate is imposed on candles (devotion deserves to be stimulated); in the Netherlands, flowers used to be 
taxed at the lower rate (who would dare to question this in tulip country, except the Dutch?); and in France, 
monuments and memorials receive favorable treatment (Gallic glory must be preserved in stone). 
66Reduced rates as well as uniform VAT rates are at odds, of course, with the Ramsey inverse-elasticity rule of 
taxation, which holds that the efficiency costs of taxation can be minimized by applying higher-than-average 
rates to goods with price-inelastic demand and lower-than-average rates to goods with price-elastic demand. As 
Harberger (1990) has argued persuasively, however, uniform taxation can be defended on pragmatic policy 
grounds. Unlike the Ramsey-rule solution, it does not require knowledge of demand and supply relations 
(generally not available anyway) and is more robust to changes in tastes and technology. (To be sure, 
differences in intra-EU VAT rates reduce efficiency in exchange because they drive a wedge between the 
marginal rates of substitution faced by consumers residing in different Member States.) Furthermore, 
nonuniform rates can be used for protective purposes by imposing higher rates on goods and services that are 
mainly imported and lower rates on goods and services that are mainly exported and on nontradable goods and 
services. 
67A notable exception is Portugal, which abolished the zero rate for foodstuffs. Hungary, one of the new 
accession countries, did the same. 
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(d) Interstate Coordination 
Current Arrangements and Perceived Problems 
Upon the abolition, in 1992, of border controls between its Member States, the 
EU agreed to tax cross-border trade between registered businesses within the EU 
on a deferred payment or postponed accounting basis.68 Although, per force, 
over-the-counter sales to nonregistered traders and consumers are taxed on an 
origin basis, the VAT on transactions between registered businesses is collected 
on a reverse charge basis: purchasers of out-of-state goods and services declare 
the imports, called acquisitions, apply VAT and take credit for the same amount, 
all in the same return.69 The deferred payment system is backed up by a VAT 
Information Exchange System (VIES for short), which requires taxable persons 
to file quarterly reports of out-of-state supplies and acquisitions. In addition, a 
statistical data collection system, referred to as the Intrastat system, was set up to 
collect trade data on goods (not services) between Member States. 
The deferred payment system breaks the fractional VAT collection process, 
however, because intra-Community supplies are zero-rated. This enlarges the 
scope for ‘carousel’ (export of goods at zero VAT and return for sale VAT-free) 
and similar frauds. According to the European Commission, an examination of a 
thousand reported VAT frauds revealed 1300 million euro of VAT forgone, 
which it believed to be ‘the tip of the iceberg’ (quoted in European Parliament, 
2001). For this reason, it seeks to replace the ‘transitional regime’ by a 
‘definitive regime’ under which exports by registered traders would be subject to 
the VAT of the Member State of sale.  
Alternatives to the Transitional Regime 
The Commission has developed two alternatives to the transitional regime for 
the trade between registered traders. Not to be outdone, the tax literature has 
added two more. The requirements for the alternatives are in order of 
importance: (i) operational autonomy of the Member States, particularly with 
regard to rate setting; (ii) no distinction to be made between domestic and out-of-
state sales (i.e. no break in the VAT chain); and (iii) compliance cost and 
enforcement symmetry between importing and exporting Member States. 
                                                                                                                                    
68The deferred payment system has been in use in the Benelux countries ever since these countries introduced 
the VAT in the late 1960s and early 1970s and has been incorporated in Title XVIA of the Sixth Directive 
(Cnossen, 1998). The system is backed up by special rules for cross-border mail-order sales (subject to the 
VAT of the country of destination), cross-border purchases by exempt entities (obliged to file returns and pay 
VAT) and cross-border car purchases (subject to VAT in the country of registration).  
69The reverse charge procedure has led to various problems with the expansion of internet and the arrival of e-
commerce (European Commission, 1998). Electronic goods downloaded from outside the EU are not subject to 
VAT. A number of proposals have been made to deal with third-country suppliers: registration in a single 
Member State (Commission), all Member States (France), and no tax at all on e-commerce (UK). Discussions 
on the problem continue in Council. 
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The four destination-based alternatives are the following: 
• The clearing house (Cnossen, 1983; European Commission, 1985), under 
which out-of-state exports would be taxed by the Member State of origin and 
importers would be entitled to a tax credit for the out-of-state VAT. To 
restore the workings of the destination principle, the VAT administration of 
the exporting state would remit the VAT collected on exports to the 
administration of the importing state. Basically, only net balances would have 
to be settled, possibly through some central clearing house. Since, 
subsequently, clearing on the basis of individual transactions was considered 
too cumbersome, the Commission proposed clearing on the basis of estimates 
of consumption in the various Member States. As pointed out by Lee, Pearson 
and Smith (1988), enforcement asymmetry is the most serious flaw of the 
clearing house. Importing Member States have little incentive to verify the 
claim for tax credits on out-of-state purchases. But this would seem to apply 
to all tax-information-sharing agreements. 
• Home-state taxation (European Commission, 1996a), i.e. VAT collection by 
the place of business establishment, instead of, as at present, the location of 
the transaction. This would involve abolition of zero-rating of intra-EU 
transactions, cross-border sales being taxed in the same fashion as domestic 
sales and cross-border movement of goods within the same business going 
untaxed. As under the clearing house, importers would be able to credit the 
VAT on out-of-state purchases against their own VAT liability. VAT 
revenues on interstate transactions would be allocated between Member 
States on the basis of statistics of aggregate consumption. The drawbacks of 
this proposal are considerable involvement of the central level, enforcement 
asymmetry and perverse effects on the choice of the location of business 
establishment (Smith, 1997). 
• The compensating VAT (CVAT) on sales between Member States (McLure, 
2000; Versano, 2000), which would leave zero-rating of sales between 
Member States intact, but would impose a central VAT solely for the purpose 
of protecting the VAT chain in addition to the VATs of the Member States.70 
No net revenue would be collected under the CVAT, because the VAT on 
exports would be canceled by the tax credit of the VAT on imports. 
Obviously, the CVAT requires a central administration, including uniform 
laws. Traders, moreover, would still have to make a distinction between 
domestic sales subject to the national VAT and out-of-state sales which 
would be zero-rated under the national VAT but taxed under the CVAT.71 
                                                                                                                                    
70McLure (2000) notes that ‘[t]he CVAT minimizes the risk that households and unregistered traders will 
attempt to masquerade as registered traders located in other states, in order to make zero-rated purchases’. 
71The enforcement properties of the CVAT resemble the workings of the dual VAT in Canada, i.e. the 
combination of a federal VAT with a provincial VAT in Quebec (and piggybacked VATs in the Atlantic 
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• The viable integrated VAT (VIVAT) developed by Keen and Smith (1996, 
1999), which would preserve the VAT chain by imposing an EU-wide 
uniform rate on all cross-border transactions between registered traders. 
Exports would be taxed and importers would be entitled to a tax credit for 
out-of-state purchases. A Member State’s preference for a VAT rate higher 
than the common rate would be satisfied by permitting it to differentiate its 
rate for sales not made to registered traders (e.g., at retail). The problem with 
this scheme is that it substitutes the requirement that a distinction be made 
between domestic and out-of-state transactions by a perhaps more onerous 
distinction between retail sales and out-of-state sales.72 
Improving the Transitional Regime 
A number of points can be made in comparing these alternatives with the current 
transitional regime. 
First, none of the proposals listed above produces any evidence that the zero-
rating of out-of-state supplies under the transitional regime involves 
unmanageable fraud. Interestingly, the Member States do not complain about the 
regime. The Benelux countries have operated the transitional regime (without 
even requiring identification numbers until 1992) ever since they introduced the 
VAT. Exemption of sales between related firms, as proposed under home-state 
taxation and probably also desirable under the clearing house, would similarly 
move out-of-state supplies outside VAT control. 
Secondly, the weight that is attached to the no-break-in-the-VAT-chain 
criterion seems somewhat exaggerated (the same applies to the criterion of 
enforcement symmetry). The zero-rating of exports moves the VAT somewhat 
closer to a retail sales tax, which suspends the tax liability throughout the entire 
pre-retail production and distribution chain. But that is all. The EU once 
formulated the requirement that exports should be taxed and the tax on imports 
not be remitted, in the belief that the destination principle should be replaced by 
the origin principle.73 Later developments showed that the belief was misplaced. 
Thirdly, the alternatives focus nearly exclusively on the movement of goods. 
Reverse charge mechanisms would have to remain in place for the out-of-state 
provision of services, both from within and from outside the EU. Indeed, it is 
hard to envisage any watertight no-break-in-the-VAT-chain system of control 
(that would not have to rely on voluntary compliance), if desired, without some 
form of international cooperation in addition to EU-wide controls. 
Fourthly, and perhaps most importantly, the transitional regime in 
conjunction with the VIES is equivalent in effect to the CVAT. Under both 
                                                                                                                                    
provinces). Bird and Gendron (1998, 2000) advocate this dual VAT for use in federal countries. For a recent 
review of various VAT cooperation schemes, see also Bird and Gendron (2001). 
72Keen and Smith (1996) note that ‘[t]his is not a trivial burden’. 
73See the preamble to the Second Directive on Value Added Tax. 
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systems, out-of-state supplies are monitored: by a central administration under 
CVAT (with zero revenue) and on a bilateral but centrally prescribed basis under 
VIES. But a central CVAT would probably be more costly to administer than a 
well-designed VIES, because it would require a central administration.74 
In light of these considerations, the transitional regime would seem to deserve 
a second hearing.75 To be sure, the regime requires review, because the 
compliance costs for VAT and especially Intrastat with respect to out-of-state 
supplies are exceptionally onerous. Verwaal and Cnossen (2002) have shown 
that, for Dutch firms, the differential compliance costs of VIES and Intrastat are, 
on average, 5 percent of the value of intra-EU transactions (and they exceed 12 
percent of value if firms have only 12 transactions or fewer per annum).76 The 
trade data required under Intrastat are particularly onerous, accounting for over 
80 percent of differential compliance costs. Both the additional VAT 
requirements and the Intrastat obligations act as border taxes that impede intra-
EU trade and distort competition.  
Verwaal and Cnossen (2002) suggest that the fragmentary Intrastat 
obligations should be abolished.77 The introduction of the euro obviates the need 
to collect data for trade and exchange rate policy purposes. Beyond that, the 
obligations do not apply to services, a large and growing proportion of intra-EU 
trade. Moreover, declared values of intercompany transactions, representing a 
sizable portion of intra-EU trade in goods, are largely meaningless. To improve 
compliance control on out-of-state transactions, the authors suggest that 
individual Member States should be encouraged to perform joint audits of VAT 
returns (by analogy, bilateral and multilateral agreements already exist to 
investigate criminal activities). Also, firms with a small volume of intra-EU trade 
could be compensated for the disproportionately higher differential compliance 
costs that they incur. Compensation equal to 5 percent of the first 1 million euro 
of out-of-state sales would reduce average compliance costs to less than 0.5 
                                                                                                                                    
74McLure (2001) emphasizes that the CVAT was designed primarily for developing countries and countries in 
transition, where breaks of credit on internal trade probably would be important. In his view, the CVAT is not 
needed in the EU, where there is high-quality tax administration and an adequate level of communication and 
cooperation between tax authorities.  
75In its Communication of June 2000, the European Commission (2000) gave priority to improving the 
transitional regime rather than to creating a definitive regime based on the Member State of sale. 
76As the authors indicate, it is unlikely that the differential compliance costs would be lower in other Member 
States. The Netherlands has a VAT administration that is exceptionally exporter-friendly on account of the 
many EU-wide distribution networks in the country. In addition, it has ample experience with the transitional 
regime. 
77Intrastat requires data for each category of goods (identified by the corresponding eight-digit code) on the 
Member State of supply and acquisition, volume, value, nature of the transaction, supply conditions and the 
probable mode of transportation. 
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percent of the value of these sales.78 As a complementary measure, large firms 
that form links in complex intra-EU supply chains might be issued licenses 
permitting them to trade with firms in other Member States on a no-tax basis.  
Is Rate Approximation Really Necessary? 
Minimum standard and reduced rates were agreed upon (with the notable 
exception of the zero rate in Ireland and the UK) at the end of 1992, purportedly 
to reduce the incentive for cross-border shopping. However, the evidence that 
was available at that time did not indicate that the agreement was necessary. 
Table 5 shows that the magnitude of cross-border shopping is minimal. The 
studies mentioned in the table conclude that the magnitude of cross-border 
shopping diminishes rapidly with the distance that must be covered to shop more 
cheaply elsewhere.79 Although the magnitude is not irrelevant in the border 
regions themselves, it is small in the national context. In South-Limburg, two-
thirds of retail sales lost on account of cross-border shopping was made up by 
purchases of nonresidents living across the border in Belgium and Germany (this 
effect is not shown in the table). Furthermore, on a net basis, two-thirds of the 
value of cross-border shopping had to be attributed to consumer purchases 
subject to excises. In other words, differences in excises rather than VAT rates 
are at the root of the cross-border shopping issue. 
TABLE 5 
Cross-Border Shopping in Some EU Regions 
Member 
State 
Region Year Percentage of 
consumption expenditures 
   
Difference in 
standard rate 
(% points) Regional National 
Netherlands South-Limburg 1991 Germany 4.5 8.5 0.6 
   Belgium –0.5   
Denmark Sønderjylland 1991 Germany 8.0 5.7 0.9 
Denmark < 50 km 1985 Germany 8.0 3.0 1.0 
Ireland Border counties 1986 UK 10.0 10.0 2.0 
Sources: Netherlands and Denmark – Bode, Krieger-Boden and Lammers (1994); Denmark – Bygrå et al. 
(1987); Ireland – Fitz Gerald et al. (1988). 
 
Furthermore, Fitz Gerald, Johnston and Williams (1995) did empirical 
research (based on interviews with 2,000 households) on the distance that Irish 
buyers are prepared to travel to be able to shop more cheaply in the UK. It 
                                                                                                                                    
78Compensation might take the form of a proportional tax credit against the VAT payable as shown on the 
return. Interestingly, Denmark has a mechanism under its income tax to compensate small firms for the 
disproportionately higher compliance costs that they incur (Sandford, 1995). 
79In addition, it is not possible to avoid the VAT on mail-order purchases and certain consumer durables, such 
as motor vehicles and yachts, because tax must be paid in the Member State of destination or registration. 
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transpired that Irish consumers appear to be willing to travel more than 50 
kilometers only if the VAT-induced price difference is 10 percent or more at an 
expenditure level of 300 euro or higher. The Irish do not shop across the border 
for purchases of 100 euro or less. The study therefore concludes that substantial 
VAT differences are tolerable in a internal market without harming the VAT 
yield of individual Member States. Again, the study shows that excise 
differences (high taxes on relatively expensive but small-volume articles) 
dominate cross-border-shopping behavior.  
These findings are corroborated by various Commission reports which have 
found that the abolition of border controls has resulted in ‘no significant changes 
in cross-border purchasing patterns, nor any significant distortions of 
competition or deflections of trade through disparities in VAT rates’ (European 
Parliament, 2001). They indicate that EU-wide agreements on minimum (or 
maximum) VAT rates are not necessary and therefore not desirable. 
2. Excises 
Although Article 99 (old) of the Treaty of Rome mentions excises in the same 
breath as sales taxes as prime candidates for harmonization, so far progress has 
been excruciatingly slow. Often, excise harmonization has been spontaneous, i.e. 
as borders came down and mobility increased, excises were reduced to their 
lowest common rate.  
The coordination of the excises in the EU is based on three sets of directives: 
(i) three directives on the structures of the excises on manufactured tobacco 
(cigarettes and manufactured tobacco other than cigarettes; Directive 95/59/EC), 
alcohol and alcoholic beverages (Directive 92/83/EEC) and mineral oils 
(Directive 92/81/EEC); (ii) four directives on the approximation of the rates of 
duty applicable to these products (Directives 92/79/EEC, 92/80/EEC, 92/84/EEC 
and 92/82/EEC); and (iii) a directive on the duty-free movement and monitoring 
of excisable products (in lieu of previous border controls) between Member 
States (Directive 92/12/EEC). 
(a) Review and Developments 
Table 6 shows excise revenue as percentages of GDP and of total tax revenue, as 
well as current excise duties on tobacco, alcohol and gasoline in the various 
Member States. In 1999, total excise revenues averaged 3.8 percent of GDP for 
the EU as a whole, down from 4.4 percent in 1970. Since the total tax ratio, 
according to OECD (2001), rose from 31.2 percent to 41.3 percent in the period 
under review, excise revenue as a percentage of total tax revenue declined by, on 
average, an eighth.80 As indicated by the table, wide differences exist between 
                                                                                                                                    
80In evaluating the revenue role of excisable products, the VAT, which is imposed at standard rates on excise-
duty-inclusive prices, should also be taken into consideration. Generally, the sales taxes levied prior to the 
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Member States. Denmark collects 5.6 percent of GDP in excise revenue, but 
Belgium is content with 2.4 percent. Ninety percent of excise revenues derive 
from three products – tobacco, alcohol and mineral oil. 
TABLE 6 
Excises in the EU, 2002 
Euro 
Excise revenue 
as percent of: 
 Member  
 Statea  
GDP 
(%) 
Total tax 
revenue
(%) 
Pack of 20 
cigarettesb
1 liter of 
beerc 
1 liter of 
wined 
0.75 liter 
of 40% 
spiritse 
1 liter of 
unleaded 
gasolinef 
 Denmark 5.6 11.0 3.29 0.62 0.95 11.09 0.54 
 Luxembourg 5.0 12.0 1.41 0.01 0 3.12 0.37 
        
 Finland 4.7 10.1 3.03 0.29* 2.35 15.14 0.56 
 Portugal 4.6 13.5 1.51 0.17 0 2.51 0.48 
Ireland 4.5 13.8 3.97 0.19* 2.73 8.29 0.51 
 Greece 4.4 11.9 1.70 0.01 0 2.72 0.32 
        
 UK 3.6 10.0 5.64 0.19* 2.50 9.50 0.79 
 Sweden 3.5 6.8 2.70 0.15* 2.26 15.45 0.48 
 Netherlands 3.5 8.3 2.07 0.25 0.59 4.51 0.61 
 Italy 3.5 8.0 1.54 0.01 0 1.94 0.52 
        
 France 2.9 6.4 2.71 0.03* 0.03 4.35 0.57 
 Spain 2.8 7.9 1.33 0.01 0 2.22 0.43 
 Germany 2.8 7.3 2.29 0.01 0 3.91 0.62 
 Austria 2.7 6.2 1.96 0.02 0 3.00 0.41 
 Belgium 2.4 5.2 2.09 0.02 0.47 4.98 0.49 
        
 Average 3.8 9.2 2.48 0.13 0.79 6.18 0.51 
aIn descending order of excise revenue to GDP ratio. 
bExcises and VAT on the most popular price category of cigarettes. 
cThe agreed minimum excise duty is 748 euro per hectoliter per degree Plato of finished product or, in the case 
of those countries marked *, 1.87 euro per hectoliter per degree of alcohol of finished product. 
dOn still wine, the agreed minimum excise duty is 0 euro per hectoliter of product. 
eThe agreed minimum excise duty is 550 euro or 1,000 euro per hectoliter of pure alcohol. 
fThe agreed minimum excise duty is 287 euro per 1,000 liters. 
Sources: Revenues (1999) – OECD (2001), headings 5221 (excises) and 5122 (profits of fiscal monopolies); 
duties – Mogensen (2002). 
 
The harmonization of the excises seems more urgent than the harmonization 
of the VAT for four reasons. First, excises, particularly on drinking and smoking, 
probably interfere less with production efficiency than the VAT, let alone taxes 
                                                                                                                                    
introduction of the VAT did not include excisable products in the base. Since VAT does apply to these 
products, the excise-plus-VAT ratios probably did not decline. 
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on labor and capital. Secondly, harmonization would reduce the incentive for 
tax-base snatching, i.e. setting low excise duty rates to attract consumers from 
other Member States. As argued above, cross-border shopping is mainly 
motivated by differences in excises, not in VAT. Thirdly, harmonization would 
improve the efficiency of exchange. Fourthly, if fuel and motor vehicles are used 
in the production process, harmonization of the related excises reduces 
intercountry distortions from excise-induced differences in cost structures. 
(b) Individual Excises 
Tobacco Taxes 
Tobacco taxes in the EU are the highest in the world. The total tax (excises and 
VAT) on cigarettes (approximately 95 percent of manufactured tobacco 
consumption) is, on average, 75 percent of the retail price, which equals 300 
percent of the tax-exclusive price.81 The high taxes on tobacco are mainly 
rationalized as a charge for the social cost of smoking, although the principle of 
consumer sovereignty indicates that this argument is not very persuasive if 
information failures are few (90 percent of people are aware of the health risks 
of smoking) and external costs (damage done to the health of other people) are 
better taken care of through bans on smoking in public areas. For the US, the 
gross social costs of smoking have been estimated at 43 cents per pack of 
cigarettes and the net costs (netting out healthcare expenditures resulting from 
smokers’ premature deaths) at 16 cents (Manning et al., 1989). Similar figures 
for the EU would imply that tobacco excises (Table 6) far exceed net social 
costs. 
The debate in the EU on the tobacco excise centers on the most appropriate 
balance between specific and ad valorem taxation. Southern Member States 
favor the ad valorem rate, which tends to protect their cheap, home-grown 
tobaccos. Northern Member States, on the other hand, have a preference for 
specific taxation, which probably better reflects the social costs of smoking, may 
be more effective in reducing the level of tobacco consumption and involves less 
trade diversion.82 
The locked-in positions have led to a compromise under which the specific 
rate can range from 5 percent to 55 percent of the retail price (inclusive of tax) of 
the most popular brand of cigarettes. In addition, the total excise – specific and 
ad valorem – should be at least 57 percent of the retail price. Beyond that, the 
minimum applicable VAT rate should be 15 percent (the agreed minimum of the 
VAT rate approximation directive). As a result, the total tax on a pack of 20 
cigarettes varies widely in the EU, ranging from 5.64 euro in the UK to 1.33 euro 
                                                                                                                                    
81In comparison, the VAT rate of, on average, 19.4 percent in the EU, which is also calculated on the price 
exclusive of tax, seems very modest.  
82For a recent review and evaluation of tobacco taxes in the OECD, see Cnossen and Smart (2002). 
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in Spain (Table 6). Not surprisingly, bootlegging (tax-base snatching) is a major 
problem. Recently (Directive 2000/10/EC), it has been agreed that the total 
excise should not be less than 60 euro per thousand cigarettes (or 95 euro if 
Member States do not comply with the 57-percent rule).83 This implies a heavier 
dose of specific taxation. The increase in total tax also increases the smuggling 
problem, particularly when the central and eastern European countries are 
admitted to the EU. 
Alcohol Excises 
Harmonization of the alcohol excises is mostly of the spontaneous kind. Over the 
years, the EU has drifted in the direction of the lowest common excise rate. As 
Table 6 indicates, in eight Member States the beer excise is 3 euro cents or less 
per liter. Seven Member States do not levy any excise on still wine and in France 
the excise is 3 euro cents. Excise duties on a bottle of spirits range from 
1.94 euro in Italy to 15.45 euro in Sweden, but in 10 Member States the duty 
level is 5 euro or less. Perhaps the erosion of the alcohol tax base is not 
surprising, since the EU is the most important wine-growing region and beer-
producing region in the world.84 With only one-eighth of the world’s population, 
the EU consumes one-half of all alcohol produced in the world. Although the 
European Court of Justice has banned the most flagrant forms of discrimination 
against out-of-state producers (Cnossen, 1987), Member States still protect their 
national vinicultures by applying excise rate structures that distinguish between 
still and sparkling wines and between ordinary and fortified wine, instead of 
basing them on alcohol content.  
While two drinks per day are said to be good for you (suggesting that these 
drinks should not be subject to excise), excessive alcohol consumption entails 
social costs, such as vandalism, traffic accidents and violent behavior (whose 
costs should be internalized through the alcohol excise). It is not possible, 
however, to implement an alcohol excise tax structure that differentiates on the 
basis of the volume consumed. The European Commission (1989) has suggested 
that minimum rates should be set, supplemented by target or reference rates for 
medium-term harmonization. Broadly, as indicated by the verdicts of the 
European Court of Justice (Case 170/78 ECR (1985)), the relative strength of 
alcoholic beverages is taken as the criterion in judging whether equality in 
competitive conditions within Member States is observed. Thus, large 
differences between Member States are still possible, resulting in substantial 
                                                                                                                                    
83In due course, the EU will also have to think about the design of an excise on drugs, such as marijuana and 
cocaine. Although less addictive than nicotine, so far these drugs are illegal although widely used. As The 
Economist (July 28, 2001) argues persuasively, legalization has more advantages than disadvantages, even 
though the consumption of the drugs would rise. 
84The taxation of alcoholic beverages (and tobacco) is related to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), which 
subsidizes the production of grapes, grains and hops (and tobacco). 
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bootlegging, e.g. between the UK and France, between Sweden and Denmark 
and between Denmark and Germany.85 
Road User Charges and Taxes 
Road (and similar transport) services resemble goods produced in the private 
sector that are used optimally when their price, commonly referred to as the 
economic user charge, equals the costs of operating the road network. Road user 
charges should contain charges for efficient road use, congestion and road 
damage, as well as charges for other externalities, such as pollution, noise and 
accidents, the VAT and additional taxes for revenue or equity reasons. Road user 
charges can be set to cover the total costs of operating the network or the 
difference between the social marginal cost and the average private cost of road 
use. Newbery (2002) identifies the conditions under which the two are equal. 
Charging efficient prices will recover the total costs of the road network if the 
marginal cost of road expansion is constant.  
The major forms of road user charges and taxes that are used in the EU 
comprise taxes on fuel, taxes on motor vehicle purchases and license fees. Of 
these charges and taxes, the gasoline excise is the highest in all Member States, 
averaging 51 euro cents per liter in the EU (Table 6). According to Newbery 
(2002), this is about the right amount for the pure road charge and green tax 
element.86 On this basis, Belgium, Ireland and Italy are taxing gasoline at about 
the right rate, but the UK, Germany, the Netherlands, France and Finland are 
overcharging road users. Furthermore, Newbery estimates that the additional tax 
(currently, purchase tax and license fee) that might be justified is only a further 
30 percent on top of the road charge and green tax element.  
In most Member States, then, the pricing function of road user charges and 
taxes is overshadowed by their role as general revenue-raisers. Often, the 
fallacious argument is used that the higher tax level is needed to finance 
healthcare and education. In fact, however, governments are exercising their 
market power to drive up the scarcity price of the natural monopoly under their 
control. Much more can be done, moreover, to improve the design of road user 
charges and taxes. In particular, a system of electronic road pricing is likely to be 
a more efficient way of dealing with road use than the existing blunt instruments 
of fuel excises and public transport subsidies. 
Green Taxes 
Fossil fuel taxes are also used to arrest global warming caused by the emission of 
carbon dioxide. Although the European Commission’s (1991) proposal for a 
                                                                                                                                    
85The problem is particularly acute between Denmark and Sweden, where about a quarter of spirits consumed 
are bought outside the consumer’s own Member State (European Parliament, 2001). 
86However, most Member States are undertaxing diesel relative to gasoline. Diesel delivers more kilometers to 
the liter and should therefore be taxed higher instead of lower than gasoline. 
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carbon tax was never approved (Pearson and Smith, 1991), several Member 
States have restructured their excise systems in line with environmental 
objectives. Existing taxes have been redesigned to favor less-polluting products 
(e.g. unleaded vs. leaded gasoline) and new taxes have been introduced to raise 
the price of polluting products or processes (e.g. on fertilizers, pesticides, sulfur, 
disposable containers, basic chemicals and batteries). Taxes on carbon are now 
on the statute in Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands and Sweden. In all of these 
Member States, the revenue is used to reduce labor income taxes, particularly 
employers’ social security contributions.87 
On the basis of a comprehensive survey, Barde and Braathen (2002) conclude 
that green taxes and other environmentally related levies in EU Member States 
(and other OECD countries) still exhibit a number of shortcomings. In most 
cases, the externality–tax linkage is weak, the rates are low, the bases are riddled 
with exemptions (e.g. for coal, often subsidized), taxes overlap with regulations, 
and international coordination, required to contain border-crossing externalities, 
is not forthcoming.  
V. TAXES ON LABOR 
Greater labor market participation is high on the political agenda in most EU 
Member States. Low participation and high unemployment are a waste of human 
potential and national product and one of the root causes of most prevailing 
social and economic inequality in the EU. Long-term unemployment 
(approximately half of total unemployment, against only 10 percent in the US), 
creates considerable political tensions. It is heavily concentrated among low-
skilled workers. These workers tend to develop a state of ‘learned helplessness,’ 
as they lose their working habits and their motivation to work. Greater labor 
market participation is also important in the face of an aging population in most 
Member States. 
1. Labor Participation and Effective Tax Rates on Labor 
As Table 7 indicates, the labor force participation rates of 13 Member States are 
lower than the rate is in the US (in addition, workers in the EU put in fewer 
hours – totaling some 9 weeks per annum). In 2000, more than three out of four 
persons of working age were gainfully employed in the US, but less than three 
out of five in Italy. Particularly, Germany, France, Spain and Italy, jointly 
accounting for 60 percent of the labor force in the EU, have low participation 
and high unemployment rates. The Netherlands’ unemployment rate of 2.7  
 
                                                                                                                                    
87See Section V. For a wide-ranging review of the theory and practice of environmental taxation, see also 
Bovenberg and Cnossen (1995). 
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62.8 
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59.9 
11.0 
54.5 
57.0 
59.8 
59.8 
63.6 
63.6 
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percent is the lowest in the EU, but its participation rate of 74.9 percent is lower 
than the US rate. Part of unemployment in the Netherlands is disguised in 
disability schemes.88 Denmark and Sweden are the only EU Member States that 
have higher participation rates than the US rate and relatively low unemployment 
rates. 
In view of these dismal statistics, Make Work Pay (MWP) policies are high 
on the political agenda in various Member States, such as Belgium, France and 
Ireland (OECD, 2000). Tax reform – e.g. in the form of earned income tax 
credits (EITCs) – is considered one of the appropriate instruments to attain the 
objectives of MWP policies. It is believed that the high effective tax rates on 
labor, particularly at the lower end of the income distribution, have a detrimental 
effect on labor supply (by reducing after-tax wages)89 and demand (by raising 
labor costs). Accordingly, it has been proposed that taxes on labor should be 
lowered. The European Commission (1996), for instance, has proposed 
switching the tax burden from labor to consumption, capital and/or energy. 
Table 7 also shows the level of the total average and marginal tax rates on 
labor in the various Member States. The total average tax rate measures total 
taxes relative to the employer’s total pre-tax labor cost, while the marginal tax 
rate is defined as the total tax liability on an additional unit of gross labor 
income. Total taxes include social security contributions (by employers and 
employees), individual income taxes and consumption taxes.90 All these taxes 
drive a ‘wedge’ between the employer’s gross labor cost (i.e. gross wages plus 
employers’ social security contributions) and the worker’s after-tax disposable 
income (including child benefits, if any, paid by government); hence, all should 
influence the demand and supply of labor. The tax wedges are given for single 
workers91 with income levels corresponding to 67 percent, 100 percent and 167 
percent of the gross labor cost of an average production worker (APW). The 67 
percent APW income level is of interest because it is close to the minimum 
wage, which tends to be 50 percent of the APW income level in most Member 
States.92 In turn, the minimum wage is close to the acceptable social minimum 
level of income, to which social benefits are related. 
                                                                                                                                    
88Adema (1999) shows that disability spending in the Netherlands, at 4.1 percent of GDP (three times higher 
than in Germany), is the highest in the EU. 
89This assumes that the uncompensated wage elasticity is positive. Generally, the elasticity is zero for primary 
males, but positive elasticities have been recorded for married women and part-time workers. 
90That taxes should include consumption taxes is argued persuasively by OECD (1995) and Nickell (1997). As 
argued above, social security contributions should also be included, because there is hardly an actuarial link 
between contributions and benefits. 
91OECD (2001b) also gives total average and marginal tax rates at various earnings levels for single workers 
with two children and married workers without children and with two children.  
92Below the 67 percent level, the average tax rate is a less reliable indicator of the tax burden, because various 
income and housing support benefits may be significant sources of income. The same applies to earnings levels 
higher than the 1.67×APW income level, because income from owner-occupied housing and savings then 
become important.  
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The most striking feature of the table is how high the effective tax rates on 
labor are in most Member States. At the average earnings level in Belgium and 
Sweden, unmarried workers without children pay over 60 percent of their annual 
wages in taxes. (For every euro of an APW’s gross wage in Belgium, only about 
36 euro cents is freely disposable.) In eight Member States, the percentage is 
higher than 55 percent. Two large Member States – Germany and France – have 
among the highest taxes on labor in the EU. In only one Member State – the UK 
– does the average tax rate (of 41 percent) at the APW earnings level come close 
to, albeit still exceeding, the average tax rate of 37 percent in the US. 
Nevertheless, there is no obvious link between the level of taxation, either 
overall or on labor, and participation rates (or unemployment) among Member 
States.93 
A comparison of the figures in Table 7 with the results in The OECD’s Jobs 
Study (1995) and table 1 in Sørensen (1997), moreover, indicates that, since 
1992, the total average tax rates at the APW as well as at the 0.67×APW 
earnings level (just above the minimum wage) have increased in most Member 
States.94 Increases in social security contributions and consumption taxes have 
been used to finance, among others, old-age benefits and a reduction in 
individual income tax rates for top-rate earners (above the 1.67×APW earnings 
level).  
As expected, Member States with high average tax rates also have high 
marginal tax rates. In Germany, taxes absorb 69 euro cents of an APW’s pay rise 
of 1 euro, compared with 40 euro cents in the US. In 11 Member States, the 
after-tax wage of an additional hour of work is 40 percent or less of the before- 
tax wage. A comparison of the total average and marginal tax rates between 
levels of APW income shows how little progression the tax system exhibits.95 
The progressivity of the individual income tax is blunted considerably by the 
proportionality or regressivity of the social security contributions (generally 
levied at flat rates without an exempt threshold96) and the consumption taxes.  
                                                                                                                                    
93Interestingly, in general, small Member States tend to have lower levels of unemployment than large Member 
States. This suggests that institutional structures matter – structures such as coordinated national wage 
bargaining in small Member States that achieve outcomes closer to competitive markets than strong unions and 
decentralized wage bargaining in large Member States (Hoel (1991), quoted in Disney (2000)). Furthermore, 
labor unions in small Member States are more likely to internalize the government’s budget constraint.  
94The OECD’s Jobs Study notes that taxes on labor had already started to increase as early as 1978. 
95At a given income level, the progressivity of the tax system can also be measured by the coefficient of 
residual income progression (CRIP), i.e. the percentage increase in after-tax income if gross labor costs rise by 
1 percent. In other words, in the notation of Table 7, CRIP = (1 – tm)/(1 – ta). The tax system is proportional if 
this elasticity equals 1, and the further the parameter falls below unity, the higher is the degree of tax 
progressivity. In all EU Member States bar Ireland, this elasticity is 0.75 or higher at the APW earnings level. 
The CRIP is very high in Sweden, France and Portugal. 
96In addition, all Member States have income ceilings above which social security contributions are not 
payable. Generally, however, these ceilings are applicable to income levels higher than 1.67×APW earnings. 
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Against this background, the OECD’s understatement in 1995 still appears 
relevant in 2001 – that it would be surprising to conclude that taxation at such 
high average and marginal tax rates has little impact on labor markets. 
Accordingly, it seems worthwhile to revisit the OECD’s earlier analysis on 
taxation and unemployment.97 
2. Alternative Forms of Taxation and Employment 
Average and marginal tax rates have quite opposite effects on employment. An 
increase in the average tax rate reduces consumption possibilities and may 
therefore induce workers to work more (income effect), whereas an increase in 
the marginal tax rate may increase the attractiveness of leisure (substitution 
effect). Average and marginal tax rates, moreover, tend to have opposite effects 
on wage-setting behavior in noncompetitive labor markets. Generally, an 
increase in average tax rates will fuel demands for higher wages. Greater tax 
progressivity, on the other hand, will dampen wage demands (Lockwood and 
Manning, 1993) and may encourage part-time work and boost the labor 
participation of second earners if the individual is the tax unit.  
The interaction between tax structures and social benefits also affects the 
supply and demand for labor. High social benefits raise replacement rates (the 
ratio of income out of work to earnings in work) for the low-skilled as well as for 
workers eligible for retirement (unemployment trap). In addition, the withdrawal 
of out-of-work benefits upon entry to the labor market involves very high 
effective tax rates (poverty trap), which lower the incentives for schooling and 
job searching. MWP policies, therefore, seek to compensate the loss of out-of-
work benefits with the provision of in-work benefits. 
If tax reform is to promote employment by reducing the tax burden on labor, 
two conditions must be met (Bovenberg, 1995). First, the overall tax burden 
should not rise. Importantly, this overall tax burden should be defined to include 
‘implicit’ taxes (collected elsewhere in the economy but ultimately borne by 
labor in the form of lower real after-tax wages) and the excess burden of taxation 
(the economic cost over and above the tax yield). Secondly, the distribution of 
the tax burden should be moved away from workers to people outside the labor 
force, i.e. recipients of income transfers and pensions, and owners of capital and 
natural resources.98  
(a) Value Added Taxes 
Since some consumption is financed out of capital income, a revenue-neutral 
shift from labor taxes to consumption taxes would reduce the tax burden on labor 
                                                                                                                                    
97This analysis is found in chapter 4 of The OECD’s Jobs Study (1995).  
98The tax burden can also be shifted to the future by increasing the fiscal deficit, but this has become more 
difficult in light of the limit imposed by the Maastricht Treaty. 
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in the short run.99 If unanticipated, the increase in the consumption tax would be 
in the nature of an implicit one-off wealth tax (Auerbach and Kotlikoff, 1987), 
which would enhance overall efficiency and which would be borne primarily by 
older generations who own most wealth.100 Another advantage of the switch is 
that the excess burden of consumption taxes tends to be smaller than the excess 
burden of wage taxes.  
In the presence of nominal wage rigidities, furthermore, the increase in 
consumption taxes would, initially, be borne by workers rather than employers. 
This would also increase the demand for labor. This increase can be long-lasting 
if the natural rate of unemployment depends on past employment (hysteresis).101 
Similarly, the switch would have a favorable effect on the labor supply of people 
on unemployment benefits, because it would reduce their net disposable income 
and thus induce them to reenter the labor force (income effect). The success of a 
switch from taxes on labor to taxes on consumption depends, of course, on the 
extent to which demands for compensating adjustments in wages and social 
benefits can be held at bay.102 Unemployment would not fall if unemployment 
benefits are indexed for the effects of the tax switch. 
Tax switches may be expected to have different effects on different kinds of 
workers and patterns of work. Research has shown that the labor supply 
elasticities of married women and part-time workers are higher than the 
elasticities of males and full-time workers.103 With this in mind, Hutton and 
Ruocco (1999) have examined the employment effects of the increases in VAT 
and the reductions in income tax in the last decade in Germany, Italy and the 
UK, as well as the opposite switch in France. They find that this tax policy has 
helped offset rising unemployment in Germany and Italy and reinforced the 
downward movement in unemployment in the UK, through greater participation 
by women and more part-time work by both men and women. In France, the 
opposite tax policy and employment outcomes have been experienced. The 
theoretical underpinning of their findings is that a proportional VAT is less 
distortive to the leisure–consumption choice than an equal-yield progressive 
labor income tax. This switch would also alter the tax burden distribution, of 
course, and might, initially, increase unemployment before the rise in 
employment sets in. 
                                                                                                                                    
99This effect would only be temporary if (e.g. in insider–outsider models) taxes are borne by labor in the long 
run. However, in structural models, which emphasize the role of asset markets, the effect could be permanent. 
100An unanticipated tax would be time-inconsistent, of course, and hurt government’s reliability. 
101Hysteresis may occur if the working skills of the unemployed erode rapidly or if unions do not take the 
interests of the unemployed into account when bargaining about wages.  
102Furthermore, Bovenberg (1996) has pointed out that, in the short run, a switch from a source- or origin-
based labor income tax to a destination-based consumption tax would have a beneficial effect on trade, which 
might stimulate employment in the export sector.  
103The labor supply elasticity of men working full time has been shown to be zero (Pencavel, 1986). 
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Rather than focusing on the VAT in general, Sørensen (1997) has examined 
the effect of the introduction of a low-rate VAT on labor-intensive personal 
services that compete with services supplied from the informal economy. 
Emphasizing that this approach is not the solution to the European 
unemployment problem, his second-best optimal analysis suggests, nevertheless, 
that some beneficial employment effects would ensue in markets where these 
services are substitutes for leisure and where labor supply is not very elastic. 
Various Member States have acted upon this finding by imposing a reduced 
VAT rate on a specified list of labor-intensive services, such as construction, 
renovation, cleaning, childcare and hairdressing.104 
(b) Taxes on Capital 
Whether capital is undertaxed relative to labor is difficult to say. Gordon (2000) 
argues that capital should not be taxed at all. Efficiency is compromised because 
(anticipated) capital income taxes reduce capital accumulation, thereby shifting 
the burden of the tax onto labor. If so, the switch would be detrimental to 
production efficiency (and equity), because it would be better to tax labor 
directly. In open economies, moreover, capital can escape the tax burden by 
moving abroad. 
But this discussion assumes that capital is perfectly mobile. This is so with 
respect to financial capital, but not with respect to physical capital, which tends 
to be rather immobile internationally. The discussion also assumes that labor is 
homogeneous, which bypasses the distinction between skilled and unskilled 
labor. While skilled labor is more likely to be complementary to capital, 
unskilled labor can be regarded as a substitute for capital. In theory, taxes that 
increase the relative price of capital can raise the demand for unskilled labor. 
Finally, an exception should be made for location-specific rents, which can be 
taxed away without harming efficiency. 
The OECD (1995) believes that the optimal level of taxation on capital has 
little policy relevance to unemployment. In the long run, capital is likely to be 
mobile and thus able to escape the burden of differentially higher taxes. Taxing 
capital to increase demand for unskilled labor may be suicidal in a modern 
economy. Exceptionally, some increase in the tax burden might be achieved 
through policy coordination, because the EU-wide capital supply elasticity is 
lower than that for individual Member States. But, on balance, efforts should 
probably be concentrated on protecting the capital income tax base against 
erosion, particularly by mobile international financial services.  
                                                                                                                                    
104Ebrill et al. (2001) have drawn attention to the negative distributional consequences of such measures if 
small VAT-exempt firms were to lose business. In addition, the administrative complexities – delineating 
lower-taxed services from services subject to the standard rate – are substantial. Beyond that, part of the benefit 
of the incentive is likely to leak away to consumers of the lower-taxed services. 
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(c) Energy Taxes 
Another possibility would be to shift the tax burden on labor to taxes on fossil 
fuels, whose use has a detrimental effect on the environment.105 In an early, 
optimistic view, it was thought that this switch might yield a ‘double dividend’ if 
the revenue from environment-improving taxes were used to lower labor-market-
distorting income taxes. However, this view has lost much of its appeal 
(Goulder, 1995). While a better environment is a public good, abatement costs 
are borne by the private sector. These abatement costs will be higher, the higher 
is the reduction in energy use. But a high degree of success implies little revenue 
with which to lower labor income taxes.106 Thus, there is a fundamental trade-off 
between beneficial environmental effects and favorable employment effects.  
Apart from the additional substitution effect away from energy-intensive 
products, the effect on employment of a switch from labor taxes to taxes on 
energy used for final consumption purposes is broadly the same as the effect of 
an increase in VAT. The energy content of most final consumption goods does 
not vary greatly. Household fuels and motor fuels are, obviously, the exceptions 
(Pearson and Smith, 1991). The success of the switch would depend on the 
extent to which consumers outside the labor force are not compensated for the 
increase. The switch is regressive, particularly in northern Member States, which 
are heavy consumers of household fuels. Nevertheless, the Netherlands and the 
Scandinavian countries have successfully introduced separate taxes on 
household fuels, subject to an exemption for a basic volume. 
If energy taxes are imposed on producers on an origin basis, the welfare 
effect would only be beneficial if the excess burden of the new tax is smaller 
than the excess burden of labor income taxes (Poterba, 1993). Whether this is so 
is not obvious, but it may be presumed that a broad-based consumption tax, such 
as the VAT, would have a lower excess burden than a narrow-based energy tax. 
The trade-off between excess burdens is particularly acute in the EU Member 
States in view of their high tax levels. At current levels of taxation, governments 
can ill afford the substitution of distortionary but revenue-productive taxes by 
less distortionary taxes with lower yields. 
Again, only some success can be expected, to the extent that the energy tax is 
shifted to people outside the labor force, i.e. capital owners or resource owners. 
Empirical evidence suggests that capital and energy are complementary. Capital 
is thus likely to bear part of the tax burden on energy inputs, at least in the short 
term. In response, it may escape the tax burden by moving to countries without 
energy taxes. As a consequence, a lower capital stock and lower energy demand 
reduce labor productivity, thereby raising unit labor costs. Tax-exporting to 
                                                                                                                                    
105For a rigorous analysis of the trade-offs between reducing pollution and promoting employment, see 
Bovenberg (1995). 
106Polluters, moreover, will demand compensation for their loss of property rights in pollution (Bovenberg, 
1999). 
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foreign resource owners would be another option. Generally, however, no single 
consuming country can depress the supply price below the prevailing market 
price. Hence, international coordination would be required to shift an energy tax 
to resource owners. 
(d) Social Security Contributions and Income Taxes 
The demand for labor might be favorably affected by a switch from employers’ 
social security contributions (which raise labor costs) to employees’ 
contributions (which reduce take-home pay), as long as it did not lead to an 
equal rise in after-tax wage demands. Whether or not this happens depends on 
the relative elasticities of demand and supply for labor, as well as on other 
factors that impede wage flexibility, such as the minimum wage,107 and the way 
in which unemployment benefits are taxed. If after-tax wages did not change, 
then labor costs would decline by the full amount of the reduction in employers’ 
contributions. Other things being equal, this should increase the demand for 
labor and employment. Studies for some Member States (OECD, 1995) provide 
evidence that changes in employers’ contributions do indeed have a greater 
impact on unemployment than changes in employees’ contributions. 
Accordingly, some Member States have altered the composition of the 
contributions by employers and employees.108  
The tax burden on low-skilled workers could be reduced by abolishing the 
income ceilings in social security contribution schemes109 and using the revenue 
to introduce a threshold below which contributions would not be payable by the 
employer, the employee or both. In the absence of a link between contributions 
and social benefits, it might even be possible to finance benefits out of general 
revenue (Denmark) or, say, through an increase in the VAT. Nickell and Bell 
(1996) argue that a small positive effect can be expected from a reduction in 
social security contributions by the low-skilled if their wages are inflexible (in 
the event, contributions would not be wholly borne by labor). The disadvantage 
of this tax reduction is that, as the authors point out, the increase in take-home 
pay of the low-skilled would reduce the incentive to acquire training for the low-
skilled as well as for those further up the pay scale whose taxes would have to be 
increased.  
Others (e.g. van der Ploeg, 1998) have advocated an earned income tax credit 
(EITC) for reducing poverty while maintaining work incentives. Empirical 
                                                                                                                                    
107Note the equivalence between a minimum wage and a tax on employers for hiring workers who would 
otherwise be paid less than the minimum wage, with the proceeds transferred to the workers. 
108Nevertheless, in the EU as a whole, the pattern of social security contributions has changed little since 1990. 
Employers’ contributions are still twice as high as employees’ (OECD, 2001). 
109Furthermore, contributions could also be levied on social benefits. In the Netherlands, social security 
contributions for old-age and widow pensions and medical and disability schemes are levied on total taxable 
income, including social benefits. This is also the case in Denmark, which finances social benefits out of 
general revenue.  
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research in the US (Scholz, 1996; Eissa and Liebman, 1996) has found that the 
EITC (designed as a credit against income tax liability paid to low-income 
families with children) has a negative effect on hours worked. But, perhaps more 
importantly, it has unambiguously positive labor market incentives on the 
decision about whether to work. The UK and Ireland have similar ‘family credit 
schemes’, and several EU Member States offer mixtures of deductions for work-
related expenses, childcare costs and other more general forms of in-work tax 
credits (Whitehouse, 1996). Generally, the phase-out of the EITC is important. 
An abrupt phase-out produces a disincentive to increase hours conditional on 
participation (the notorious poverty trap). A gradual phase-out, on the other 
hand, reduces the positive effect on participation and is more costly to revenue.  
(e) Evaluation 
This review and update of The OECD’s Jobs Study (1995) indicates that little 
can be done to increase employment through the tax system.110 According to 
OECD (1995), the scope for shifting the tax burden away from labor to other tax 
bases is either ‘worthwhile but limited (in the case of consumption), possibly 
undesirable (capital), and probably desirable but with at best modest 
consequences for employment (energy)’. Tax-shifting within the earnings 
distribution is also of doubtful efficacy, because it would move the wedge up the 
pay scale, where it would aggravate distortions at a higher wage level. The 
OECD’s (1995) bottom line is that the tax burden on the working poor can only 
be mitigated by switching it to the nonworking prosperous old. 
This cloud has a few silver linings. First, if labor or product markets are not 
competitive or labor supply not completely inelastic, some shifting to consumers 
outside the labor force, capital owners or resource owners may be possible 
(although the effect is unlikely to be large). Secondly, tax reforms targeted at 
married women and part-time workers who have positive labor supply elasticities 
will increase employment. Thirdly, predictable positive effects on labor supply 
also occur among low-income families, particularly single parents and single-
earner couples, if an optimal mix of tax credits (and welfare benefit schemes) is 
designed (Disney, 2000).  
But, on the whole, the effect of the restructuring of tax systems to promote 
employment is meager. In a closely written assessment, Haveman (1996) 
concludes that his discussion of six central strategies111 for simultaneously 
reducing the ‘poverty trap’, providing adequate income support and increasing 
                                                                                                                                    
110For a comprehensive review and evaluation of a large number of studies on the impact of tax and welfare 
policies on employment and unemployment in OECD (including EU) countries, see Disney (2000).  
111The six central strategies are four income support regimes (a credit income tax, a negative income tax, a 
basic income guarantee and an EITC) and two labor market strategies (a wage rate subsidy and employer-based 
marginal employment subsidies). For an evaluation of low-wage job subsidies, a basic income guarantee and a 
negative income tax, see also Minford (1996). 
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both labor supply and labor demand carries one clear lesson, which is that ‘[n]o 
single policy is capable of both assuring adequate income support to those 
without sufficient earnings (i.e. poverty reduction) and stimulating an increase in 
the employment of low-skilled workers’. Furthermore, he notes that ‘[t]he “iron 
law” of income support needs to be again emphasized: an income guarantee 
assuring all citizens of an “adequate” level of living financed via an individual 
income tax requires a structure of marginal tax rates implying substantial work 
disincentives. And, the higher the guarantee, the more severe are the work 
disincentives’. 
The message is that the tax system cannot be used to compensate for the 
failures of the social security system. If a dent is to be made in the high 
unemployment rates, the trade-off between in-work benefits (poverty trap) and 
out-of-work replacement rates (unemployment trap) has to be reviewed. This 
trade-off is acute among low-income earners, but it is also inherent to many 
disability and early-retirement schemes. High replacement rates of incomes in 
and out of work and high effective marginal tax rates (including welfare benefit 
withdrawals) faced by (potential) workers reduce the incentives to enter the 
labor market, improve skills, increase effort and work longer hours.  
Finally, as emphasized by Bovenberg (1995), an essential element to success 
in reducing unemployment lies in greater real wage and relative wage flexibility. 
Job security, seniority systems, regulated pay scales and minimum wages all 
amount to implicit taxes on labor. Furthermore, ‘[t]raining and acquiring skills 
constitute the keys for breaking the vicious circle of poverty and unemployment 
and hence improve the trade-off between equity and efficiency by reducing the 
need to use distortionary instruments to redistribute income’ (Bovenberg, 1995). 
The interaction between the labor market and each Member State’s specific 
economic and social institutions underscores the need for country-specific 
measures to combat unemployment. This suggests that there is little or no role at 
the central EU level for solving the unemployment problems of the Member 
States. On the contrary, EU-wide coordination of taxes on labor, benefit schemes 
and labor market regulations would most likely exacerbate the impact of existing 
distortions and structural rigidities in the labor market. 
VI. TAXES ON CAPITAL 
In contrast to taxes on consumption, the EU Treaty provides little guidance on 
the harmonization of taxes on capital in the internal market,112 despite the 
equivalency with consumption taxes (Section II) and the continuing integration 
of capital markets. Nevertheless, in the course of the years, the European 
                                                                                                                                    
112According to Articles 100 and 101 (old), laws, including income tax laws, should be approximated if 
required for the functioning of the single market. This mandate is not as strong as the obligation in Article 99 
(old) to harmonize sales taxes and excises.  
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Commission has made various proposals to bring the capital income tax systems 
closer together.113 The proposals have regard to (corporation) tax structures, 
bases and rates, the promotion of cross-border cooperation between (related) 
enterprises, tax competition and tax administration.  
Early on, in 1975, a proposal was made for the EU-wide introduction of an 
imputation system, followed, in 1989, by a draft proposal for the harmonization 
of profit determination rules. However, both measures failed to receive the 
support of the Member States. The same fate befell a minimum 15 percent 
source tax on interest proposed first in 1989 and again in 1998 in combination 
with the alternative of a notification procedure.  
A number of less ambitious measures were adopted, however, to promote 
cross-border cooperation between enterprises. These measures include the 
parent–subsidiary directive (no withholding taxes on intercompany dividend 
payments – Directive 90/435/EEC), the merger directive (suspension of the 
taxation of capital gains arising on the cross-border transfer of assets – Directive 
90/434/EEC) and the arbitration convention (solution of double taxation issues 
in connection with adjustments to transfer prices – Directive 90/436/EEC). 
Proposals for an interest/royalty directive (no withholding taxes on intercompany 
payments – (COM(1998) 67 final) and a directive on intragroup losses 
(COM(90) 595 final) still await approval.  
Furthermore, a mutual assistance directive (Directive 77/799/EEC) was 
adopted in 1997, providing for the exchange of information between Member 
States. In the same year, a nonbinding Code of Conduct on Business Taxation, 
purporting to curtail ‘harmful tax practices’ by Member States,114 was subscribed 
to by the Member States, followed by a shame list issued by the Primarolo Group 
which identified 66 malpractices (connected to the tax-favored provision of 
financial services to third parties, intra-group financing and the provision or 
licensing of intangible property in return for royalty payments).  
The most far-reaching proposals for the harmonization of the corporation 
income taxes, in three phases, dealing with structural, base and rate issues, were 
made by the Ruding Committee (1992), but they did not leave the drawing 
board.115 Recently, picking up from the Ruding Committee, the European 
Commission (2001) issued a voluminous report on corporate taxation. The 
report, referred to as the Bolkestein Report, lists a large number of (alternative) 
options for tax coordination in the form of targeted measures and comprehensive 
solutions to reduce cross-border investment distortions and taxpayer compliance 
costs.  
                                                                                                                                    
113For useful reviews with references to the various European Council and Commission proposals, see Easson 
(1992) and European Parliament (2001). 
114For an in-depth legal analysis, see Bratton and McCahery (2001), who also pay attention to economic and 
political aspects. 
115For reviews and evaluations of the Ruding Committee Report, see Vanistendael (1992), McLure (1992), 
Devereux (1992), Gammie (1992) and Cnossen and Bovenberg (1997).  
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Broadly, most of the above-mentioned proposals fall into two categories: 
proposals that address tax structure issues and proposals that deal with barriers 
to cross-border cooperation. As background to the discussion of the various 
proposals, this section starts with a review and analysis of the capital income tax 
systems of the Member States. Next, the comprehensive proposals of the 
Bolkestein Report are evaluated. It is concluded that the proposals ignore the 
distortions of capital income tax systems within Member States, which must be 
solved if distortions between Member States are to be mitigated. Accordingly, an 
alternative reform agenda is sketched.  
1. Review and Analysis of Capital Income Tax Systems 
This review of capital income tax systems in the Member States falls into three 
parts: a survey of corporation tax regimes, an analysis of the (divergent) 
treatment of equity and debt income, and a discussion of effective tax rates. 
(a) Survey of Corporation Taxes 
Corporation taxes (CTs) in the EU (and elsewhere) are commonly distinguished 
depending on whether and to what extent they reduce the double tax – CT and 
individual income tax (PT) – on distributed profits, i.e. provide dividend relief. 
No relief is provided under the so-called classical system of CT. By contrast, 
imputation systems provide full or partial relief by permitting shareholders a tax 
credit against their PT for the CT that can be imputed to the dividends (grossed 
up by the tax credit) received by them.116 The double tax can also be mitigated 
by subjecting dividend income to a separate or schedular PT rate lower than the 
top PT rate. 
Table 8 shows the CT systems that are found in the EU Member States. 
Nominal tax rates range from 16 percent in Ireland to 41.1 percent in Germany. 
Furthermore, Member States have the following CT systems: 
• Six Member States employ the imputation system. Usually, the gross-up and 
tax credit are expressed as a fraction of the net dividend.117 Finland and Italy 
are the only Member States that permit a full tax credit against the PT for the 
CT attributable to shareholder dividends. In the UK, the relief is so small – 
merely one-ninth of the net dividend – that the system approximates the 
classical system.  
                                                                                                                                    
116Equivalent relief can be provided under a split-rate or dividend-deduction system. For the classical analysis 
of dividend-relief systems, see McLure (1979). For a more recent discussion, see also US Department of the 
Treasury (1992), and for a survey of OECD countries, see Cnossen (1997). 
117Alternatively, the relief can be expressed as a percentage of the CT (indicating the extent to which the double 
tax is mitigated) or as a percentage of the grossed-up dividend (representing the comparable tax-inclusive PT 
rate). 
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• Six Member States provide dividend relief at the shareholder level by taxing 
distributed profits at a schedular, usually flat, PT rate separate from the PT on 
other income. Germany and Luxembourg tax dividends at half of the PT rate 
applicable to other income (simply by exempting half of dividends received).  
• Two Member States exempt dividend income in the hands of individual 
shareholders. The Netherlands levies a net wealth tax instead, called 
presumptive capital income tax.118 A net wealth tax is also found in five other 
Member States (see Table 8), although these states tax dividend income (and 
capital gains) under their PTs too. 
• One Member State – Ireland – subjects dividend income fully to the twin 
yoke of the CT and the PT (classical system), although rates are so low that 
the total tax on current distributions is less than the total tax in many other 
Member States. 
The imputation system is the most structured form of relief in light of the 
normative implication of the comprehensive income tax that the taxation of 
corporate profits should be fully integrated with the PT of shareholders.119 
Imputation reduces the excess CT+PT burden on profit distributions in 
proportion to the marginal PT rates of shareholders.120 In contrast, under the 
schedular PT rate schemes, the relief is proportionately greater for high-income-
bracket PT-payers than for low-income-bracket PT-payers.121 Of interest is that 
the full imputation system in Finland is equivalent to the dividend-exemption 
systems in Greece and the Netherlands. In these countries, retained and 
distributed profits bear the same CT(+PT) burden (if capital gains taxes are  
 
                                                                                                                                    
118To preserve some semblance to the income tax, the presumptive return on shares is set at 4 percent of their 
market value; this return is taxed at 30 percent. The tax base of the presumptive capital income tax also 
includes debt instruments, real estate (except if owner-occupied) and bank deposits. Like dividends, interest 
and rental income are not taxed at the individual level. Exceptionally, the returns on the equity of the self-
employed or held in closely-held corporations are taxed on an actual, not a presumptive basis. For a review and 
evaluation of this new tax, see Cnossen and Bovenberg (2001). 
119See Musgrave and Musgrave (1984). Note that full integration under the comprehensive income tax implies 
that corporate profits should be taxed as they accrue. The CT could then be abolished. If retained, it would 
function as a withholding tax for the PT as well as a schedular income tax on the equity income of 
nonresidents. Full integration has been proposed by the Carter Commission (1966) and the US Department of 
the Treasury (1979), but it has never left the drawing board. Its practicality is in doubt. 
120More than full relief is possible under the CTs in Member States (Portugal, Spain, the UK) that permit the 
payment of dividends out of exempt profits without imposing a compensatory tax at the corporate level. 
Whether or not preferences at corporate level should be passed through to shareholders is a difficult policy 
issue that is not discussed here (but see McLure (1979, ch. 4)). 
121This regressive effect can be mitigated (as is done in Austria and Belgium) but not eliminated, by permitting 
low-income-bracket PT-payers, whose marginal ordinary PT rate is lower than the special PT rate, to opt for 
classical double taxation of their dividend income (with credit for the special PT imposed at source). Again, 
more than full relief can be provided under the special PT rate schemes if dividends are paid out of exempt 
profits. 
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Notes to Table 8: 
aCT rates include the following: 
• surcharges in Belgium (3%), France (3%), Germany (5.5%), Luxembourg (4%), Portugal (10%) and Spain 
(0.75%–0.01%); and 
• local taxes (deductible from corporate profits) in Germany (18% ) and Luxembourg (10%). Spain levies a 
local tax based on the type of business activity and the surface area of the premises. 
bFlat minimum taxes, creditable against the final CT, are levied in Austria, France and Luxembourg (in the 
form of a net wealth tax). Lower or graduated CT rates apply to lower amounts of profits or to small businesses 
in Belgium, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the UK. 
cUsually, capital gains realized by companies are subject to CT at the normal rate; generally, the gains can be 
rolled over. 
dCapital gains are adjusted for inflation in Ireland and Luxembourg. Alternatively, short-term and long-term 
gains are taxed at different (effective) rates in Denmark, Portugal, Spain and the UK. PT rates shown are for 
long-term capital gains. Various Member States exempt small amounts of capital gains. Italy levies the tax on 
accrued gains. 
eItaly levies a regional tax on productive activities (IRAP), in fact an income-type VAT at 4.25%.  
fAustria and Belgium permit a limited deduction from individual income of expenditures on the purchase of 
newly issued shares. 
gIn addition, nonresident companies and domestic legal entities other than corporations are subject to a 1% net 
wealth tax. 
hFrance provides a 25% tax credit for the subscription to shares in specified companies.  
iFrench PT on capital gains of 16% plus full social taxes. 
jItaly levies a reduced rate of 19% on profits attributable to increases in equity capital (retained profits and 
newly issued shares).  
kAn asterisk (*) indicates that the special PT rate is a final withholding tax on option. 
lIn Denmark, share income not exceeding DKr 39,700 is taxed at 28%. 
mThe CT rate is 37.5% for Greek companies with bearer shares not quoted on the Athens Stock Exchange and 
on nonresident companies. 
nIn Greece, shares in unquoted corporations are taxed at 5% of the sale price. 
oThe rate given in parentheses applies to profits of qualifying manufacturing and processing companies. 
 
ignored). Consequently, the choice between profit retention and distribution is 
not affected.  
The recent trend in the EU has been to abolish imputation systems in favor of 
schedular taxes on dividend distributions as well as other capital income. The 
cross-border implications of imputation are found to be discriminatory and 
complicated. Germany and Ireland have substituted imputation by separate 
taxation of corporate profits and distributions, schedular or full. The UK has 
greatly reduced the tax credit and confined it to domestic shareholders. From 
2001, the Netherlands simply exempts dividend income in the hands of 
shareholders (although it increased the net wealth tax rate on shares and other 
assets).  
The tax treatment of realized capital gains,122 also shown in Table 8, 
determines the CT+PT on retained profits. Generally, a distinction is made 
between capital gains on ordinary (widely-held) shares and capital gains on 
substantial holdings, i.e. controlling interests in (closely-held) corporations. 
(Capital gains on substantial holdings often represent labor income sheltered in 
                                                                                                                                    
122Exceptionally, Italy levies the tax on accrued gains in the case of ordinary shares. 
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the corporate form at a CT rate that is lower than the marginal PT rate.) Table 8 
indicates that six Member States do not tax capital gains on ordinary shares, but 
that all Member States bar Belgium tax capital gains on substantial holdings. The 
rates shown in the table are nominal rates. Deferral and numerous tax base 
preferences result in low effective capital gains tax rates. 
The last two columns of Table 8 show that, in 1999, the CTs in the Member 
States accounted for, on average, 8.7 percent of total tax revenue or 3.5 percent 
of GDP. By comparison, the CT share for the US is 9.5 percent and the CT ratio 
3.2 percent (OECD, 2001). Leaving Luxembourg out of consideration,123 the CT 
ratios of the Member States range from 1.8 percent in Germany, where only 
some 15 percent of all firms conduct their business in corporate form, to 4.2 
percent in the Netherlands, where most businesses use the corporate form and 
which derives substantial CT revenue from natural gas. A comparison with 
earlier revenue figures indicates that tax competition – the ‘race to the bottom’ – 
is not (yet) a serious issue. Although statutory tax rates have been lowered in the 
past 20 years,124 generally CT-revenue/GDP ratios have broadly stayed the same 
due to various tax base-broadening measures (Gorter and de Mooij, 2001). 
However, this does not account for the effects of rising profits (see Table 3) and 
the decline in the noncorporate form of doing business.  
(b) Treatment of Equity and Debt Income125 
Clearly, nominal tax rates on retained and distributed profits (the return on 
equity) diverge widely within and between Member States. Table 9 lists these 
rates along with the tax rate on interest (the return on debt).126 In addition, the 
top PT rate on other income is shown and the withholding taxes on dividend and 
interest remittances to nonresidents in other Member States.  
Discrimination of Profit Distributions 
Finland, Greece and the Netherlands are the only Member States that tax profit 
distributions and retentions at the same marginal CT/PT rates. As Table 9  
 
                                                                                                                                    
123The high CT yields in Luxembourg are attributable to its favorable treatment of holding companies which 
have chosen the state for their headquarters. 
124For a comparison of the decreases in CT (and top PT) rates, see Cnossen (1984, 1993 and 1997). 
125This subsection draws heavily on Cnossen and Bovenberg (1997).  
126Furthermore, taxes on net wealth and immovable property should be taken into account, but generally their 
yields are small. For a theoretical analysis of the impact of the taxes on the three forms of capital income in a 
dynamic general equilibrium framework, see Sinn (1985). 
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TABLE 9 
Corporation Taxes and Individual Income Taxes on Capital Income 
in EU Member States, 2002 
Percent 
Withholding taxes on 
nonresidents 
CT–PT system CT on 
retained 
profitsa 
CT + top-
PT on 
distributed 
profitsb,c 
PT on 
interestd 
Top PT 
rate on 
other 
incomee 
Dividends Interest 
Imputation       
Finland 29 29 29** 52.5 0–15 0 
France 341/3 65.2 26**f 57.4 0–15 0–15 
Italy 36 44 27** 45.6 15 0–15 
Portugal 33 49 20** 40 10–15 10–15 
Spain 35 52.7 48* 48 15 0–15 
UK 30 53.3 40* 40 0 0–15 
       
Schedular PT       
Austria 34 50.5 25** 50 0–15 0 
Belgium 40.2 49.1 15** 60.6 15 10–15 
Denmark 30 60.1 47.6 47.6 15 0 
Germany 41.1 56.2 36.9** 51.2 15 0 
Luxembourg 37.4 50.9 43 43 15 0–10 
Sweden 28 49.6 30 56 0–15 0 
       
Dividend exemption       
Greece 35 35 10** 42.5 0 0–10 
Netherlands 35 35 None 52 15 0 
       
Double taxation       
Ireland 16 (10) 51.3 (47.8) 20** 42 0 0–15 
aSee Table 8. Rates do not include capital gains taxes, if levied. Some information may be incomplete or out-
of-date. 
bCalculated as CT + [(1 – CT) PT] minus any tax credit if available. 
cWithholding taxes on dividends paid to residents are imposed in Austria (25%), Belgium (15%), Denmark 
(28%), Germany (21.1%), Luxembourg (25%), Italy (12.5%), the Netherlands (25%), Portugal (20%), Spain 
(18%) and Sweden (30%). Taxpayers can choose whether or not to consider the withholding tax as final in 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark and Italy. 
dAn asterisk (*) means that interest payments are subject to a withholding tax; a double asterisk (**) means that 
the withholding tax is final on option. Generally, royalty payments to residents are not subject to withholding 
tax, except in France (26% – final), Spain (18%) and the UK (22%). 
ePT rates include the following: 
• surcharges in Belgium (3%), Germany (5.5%) and Luxembourg (2.5%); 
• surtaxes in France (CSG – 7.5%; CRDS – 0.5%; prélevement social – 2%); and 
• local taxes in Belgium (7.25%), Denmark (32.6%), Finland (16.5%), Italy (1.4% – surcharge) and Sweden 
(31%). 
fIncluding social taxes. 
Source: Computed from International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation, European Taxation, Amsterdam, loose-
leaf. 
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indicates, in all other Member States, the CT+PT on current distributions127 
appears to be higher than the CT (plus capital gains tax, if any) on retained 
profits.128 The distortionary effects of this tax bias against profit distributions 
depends on the marginal source of finance (i.e. either retained profits or new 
equity). If firms finance their marginal investments through profit retention 
rather than new shares, they have to reduce dividends that would otherwise be 
available for distribution. Accordingly, the role of dividends is crucial. In this 
connection, the literature has developed two hypotheses, which are known as the 
‘traditional view’ and the ‘new view.’ 129 
The traditional view argues that dividends offer nonfiscal benefits. Dividends 
provide a signal to shareholders, for instance, that all is well with the 
corporation, or they may limit financial discretion and hence potential misuse of 
funds by management. At the margin, corporations equalize the tax 
disadvantages and nontax advantages of profits distributions. A new investment 
will in part be financed by issuing new shares, therefore, because dividends 
cannot be lowered without cost. This implies that the higher (total) tax on 
dividend income compared with retained profits discourages new investment and 
distorts the dividend-payout decision.  
The new view denies the existence of nontax advantages associated with 
profit distributions. Accordingly, the higher tax on dividend income should cause 
corporations to prefer profit retentions over new share issues as the marginal 
source of finance. Profit retention enables shareholders to enjoy the return on the 
new investment in the form of tax-preferred capital gains. Moreover, they save 
on the PT on dividend income that they would have to pay if profits had been 
distributed rather than retained. The capitalized value of this tax saving is 
exactly equal to the discounted value of the tax on distributed profits that must 
be paid in the future. Therefore, the tax on dividends does not distort investment 
decisions – at least if the corporation generates sufficient profits to finance 
marginal investments through retained profits, and the tax rate on dividends is 
expected to remain constant in the future. 
The policy implications of the two views are quite different, as Head (1996) 
points out. Under the new view, in contrast to the traditional view, any CT 
reform aimed at greater integration with the PT is of doubtful relevance from an 
                                                                                                                                    
127Note that the following simplifying assumptions have been made in calculating the effective CT+PT rates on 
distributed profits: (a) CTs are borne by profits; (b) after-CT profits are fully distributed; (c) dividends are 
received by resident PT-liable individuals; (d) individuals and corporations face the maximum CT and PT 
rates, inclusive of taxes levied by subordinate levels of government; (e) CT and PT rates remain unchanged; 
and (f) the amount of pre-tax corporate profits available for distribution remains the same, regardless of the 
level of the tax rates or the degree of mitigation. See OECD (1991). 
128The CT+PT rate on distributed profits is also clearly higher than the top PT rate on other income in 
Germany, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain and the UK. 
129For reviews and analyses of the two views on dividend taxation, see Poterba and Summers (1985), Sinn 
(1985 and 1991), Zodrow (1991) and Sørensen (1994a and 1995).  
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efficiency point of view, but must clearly be rejected on equity grounds because 
it results in windfall gains to existing shareholders. Most empirical studies 
support the traditional view.130 Whatever view is adopted, taxing dividends twice 
always harms investment by new businesses, which have to rely on new share 
issues to provide for their equity needs. The discrimination of new equity under 
less than full imputation systems, therefore, contributes to the concentration of 
market power by discouraging the entry of new firms. It is especially detrimental 
to small, growing firms that provide an important impetus to technological 
innovation.  
Preferential Treatment of Debt 
The combined PT/CT on debt equals the PT-rate on interest income, while the 
combined burden on retained earnings is the sum of the CT-rate and the capital 
gains tax rate. Table 9 indicates that interest appears to be taxed at lower rates 
than the CT+PT on profit distributions. This is obviously the case in seven 
Member States which tax interest at a lower nominal rate than retained profits. In 
the other Member States, the favorable treatment of interest is somewhat 
difficult to gauge, because the effective tax rate on capital gains is not known.131 
However, the growing liberalization of capital markets implies that the tax 
system increasingly favors debt over retentions, because it increases 
opportunities for avoiding the PT on interest. Continued financial innovation 
makes debt and equity increasingly close substitutes. In particular, the tax-
exempt status of institutional investors, such as pension funds, facilitates the 
preferential treatment of the return on debt. Typically, interest income accruing 
to pension funds is not taxed (neither is dividend income, but such income is 
taxed at source under the CT).132 Indeed, capital income may possibly be 
subsidized if lightly taxed assets are financed with loans, the interest of which is 
deductible against the taxable income of the payer but not taxed at the level of 
the payee.  
The tax-favored status of debt also discriminates against corporations that 
face difficulties in attracting debt, because they do not yet enjoy a high credit 
rating, own mainly nonliquid assets (such as firm-specific machinery), against 
which it is difficult to borrow, or generate insufficient taxable profits to be able 
to deduct interest. Consequently, these corporations, which tend to be fledgling 
                                                                                                                                    
130An important implication of the new view is that the market value of corporate assets exceeds existing share 
values. This does not seem to be the case.  
131The new Dutch tax exacerbates the debt–equity distinction since debt income is taxed once but equity 
income twice (this double tax was previously mitigated by not taxing capital gains at individual shareholder 
level) (Bovenberg and ter Rele, 1998). 
132In addition, the tax-exempt status of institutional investors affects their portfolio choice and thereby the 
ownership structure of firms. In particular, institutional investors tend to prefer bonds over shares, as the prices 
of shares, which yield a large part of their return in the form of untaxed capital gains, are bid up by taxable 
investors. 
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enterprises, have to incur higher capital costs on account of taxation than older, 
established corporations with either easier access to debt financing or sufficient 
retained profits to finance new investments. In short, the equality of competitive 
conditions is violated. 
Cross-Border Effects 
The in-state distortions described above yield important EU-wide implications 
for the taxation of equity and debt income. As regards equity income, the higher 
tax on dividends, which stimulates profit retention, reduces the amount of capital 
becoming available on European capital markets and thus hampers the 
development of European share markets. Furthermore, investments by old firms 
financed through retained earnings tend to yield a lower (before-tax) return. 
Beyond that, the tax bias in favor of old firms inhibits the entry of new firms. 
Accordingly, the tax system infringes on competitive conditions, thereby 
jeopardizing the dynamics of the internal market. Moreover, taxing profit 
distributions twice discriminates in favor of Member States with many mature 
firms (which do not need new equity). Furthermore, it confers an artificial 
advantage on Member States with corporations that conform to the ‘conduit’ 
model of the firm (with shareholders managing the company) and, therefore, do 
not need to distribute a large portion of their profits to satisfy shareholders. 
As regards debt income, the ongoing internationalization and liberalization of 
capital markets suggests that interest is hardly taxed, because these 
developments increase opportunities for evading or avoiding the PT or CT on 
interest income. Whereas retained earnings are taxed at source through the CT, 
the tax authorities cannot be sure that cross-border interest payments are 
reported and taxed.133 Moreover, withholding rates on cross-border interest 
payments (which vary by class of payer and payee, and by type of financial 
instrument – by itself a source of wasteful tax arbitrage) are very low (Table 
9).134 The result, as Huizinga (1994) concludes, is that international interest 
income to a large extent escapes taxation. This favors international debt finance, 
skews investors’ portfolios and results in an arbitrary division of the interest tax 
base between lending and borrowing Member States.135 
                                                                                                                                    
133Early on, Bird and McLure (1990) drew attention to the erosion of the capital income base through the 
combination of interest deductibility, financial innovation, international tax arbitrage and evasion. For a 
general treatment, see also Owens (1993). The European Commission (1996) has also expressed its concern 
with the situation.  
134In spite of various early efforts (European Commission, 1989a) to stem the tide, the general level of interest 
withholding taxes has declined in the past two decades. 
135Furthermore, at the EU level, the preferential treatment of debt favors Member States with institutions 
(banks and large firms with liquid assets) that allow substantial debt finance. German banks, for example, often 
resemble holding companies that are closely involved in the activities of German businesses. In this situation, 
the high CT rate does not discourage domestic investment, but mainly acts as a protective device against 
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Conclusions 
The most important conclusions of this brief review are the following. 
First, dividend and interest received by in-state share- and debtholders is 
increasingly being taxed at schedular PT rates in the form of final withholding 
taxes. Apparently, the taxation of capital income jointly with labor income on 
the basis of ability-to-pay is not viewed as important as it used to be.  
Secondly, in nearly every Member State, effective CT+PT rates on 
investment returns vary depending on the choice of financing (equity or debt), 
the corporation’s dividend policy (distribution or retention), the maturity of the 
corporation (new or old), the form in which the investment is undertaken (the 
corporate form or the noncorporate form), the tax status of the recipient of the 
return (liable to PT and/or CT, or exempt) and the place of residence of the 
recipient of the return (at home or abroad). Broadly, debt finance is favored and 
individual investors are discriminated against (also, see OECD, 1991). 
Thirdly, the symbiosis between interest deductibility and capital-rich tax-
exempt domestic and foreign sectors (and other opportunities for tax arbitrage) 
erodes the corporate (and capital) income tax base. This effect is reinforced by 
the substitution of hard-to-reach international debt (interest being taxed on the 
residence principle) for easier-to-tax equity (profits being taxed on the source 
principle).136 
(c) Effective Tax Rates 
The analysis in the previous paragraphs is corroborated by micro forward-
looking studies which calculate average and marginal effective tax rates with 
respect to different sources of finance, assets and recipients of investment 
income. Based on the methodology pioneered by King and Fullerton (1984), 
these studies draw on the statutory features of the tax system to compute implicit 
tax rates for hypothetical investment projects (in other words, new capital), given 
the rate of inflation and industry-specific financing and investment patterns. The 
advantage of micro forward-looking studies is that they provide an indication of 
the potential incentive effects of the CT system and enable a comparison 
between CT systems in different Member States. By contrast, micro backward-
looking studies measure effective average tax rates on old capital by expressing 
                                                                                                                                    
foreign takeovers and foreign ownership of domestic firms, because foreigners do not have the same easy 
access to bank finance. 
136This implies that the CT is importantly a tax on rents and returns to risk-bearing (business cash flow), not a 
tax on the normal return  to capital  (see Section II).  It is surprising that this view, first voiced by Stiglitz 
(1976), has so little influence on policy-makers. If it had more, explicit cash-flow taxation and, by extension, 
individual consumption taxes (in fact, the regime for most labor income) might be higher on the political 
agenda.  Apparently, the body politic does want to tax the normal return to capital. This treatise proceeds on 
that premiss. 
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CT collections or liabilities as a percentage of actual corporate profits shown in 
financial statements.137 
TABLE 10 
EU Member States: Effective Average Corporation Tax Rates (EATRs)a 
Percent 
Micro forward EATRs, 2001 Micro backward 
EATRs,c 1999 
 Statutory 
tax 
ratesb 
2002 
Overall Retained 
earnings 
Debt  
Germany 41.1 34.9 38.7  27.7  21.8 
Belgium 40.2 34.5 39.1  25.8  13.6 
    
Luxembourg 37.4 32.2 36.6  24.0  .. 
Italy 36 27.6 28.7  25.5 26.4 
Netherlands 35 31.0 35.2  23.3  17.9 
Spain 35 31.0 35.2  23.3  16.2 
Greece 35 28.0 32.4  19.7  .. 
France 341/3 34.7 39.0  26.8  17.6 
Austria 34 27.9 30.7  22.6  13.5 
Portugal 33 30.7 34.8  23.0  15.5 
UK 30 28.3 31.8   21.7  .. 
Denmark 30 27.3 30.7  21.0 20.9 
    
Finland 29 26.6 30.0  20.2  20.9 
Sweden 28 22.9 26.0  17.1  13.0 
    
Ireland 16 (10) 10.5 11.7    8.2 .. 
    
European Union    
Mean 32.9 28.5 32.0 22.0 17.9 
Standard deviation   6.0   6.0   6.9   4.7   4.2 
Pearson coefficient  0.92  0.91 0.93 0.12 
aAll effective tax rates pertain to CTs only.  PTs on dividends, interest, royalites and other capital income have 
not been  taken into account. 
bRanked in order of highest statutory rate. 
cCalculated on actual corporate profits inclusive of depreciation. 
Sources: Statutory tax rates – Table 5; effective tax rates (Sweden, 1998) – Nicodème (2001); EATRs – 
Devereux and Griffith (2001). 
 
The results of an important micro forward-looking study by Devereux and 
Griffith (1998, 2001) for the European Commission are shown in Table 10. 
Broadly, the ranking of the overall effective average tax rates, calculated at a 
                                                                                                                                    
137Similarly, macro backward-looking studies – e.g. Mendoza, Razin and Tesar (1994) – relate CT revenues to 
the net or gross operating surplus of corporations shown in national accounts. Nicodème (2001) rightly 
emphasizes that micro forward- and micro (or macro) backward-looking studies are not measuring the same 
thing. Hence, their results are difficult to compare.  
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given post-tax rate of return,138 is in line with the statutory tax rates (the 
Spearman ranking coefficient is 0.78). Although high tax rates tend to be 
correlated to narrow tax bases, generally tax rate differentials outweigh the 
differences in tax bases (European Commission, 2001). Among Member States, 
Germany, France and Belgium have the highest effective tax rates, while 
Finland, Sweden and Ireland tend to be in the lower range of the ranking. As 
regards sources of finance, the effective tax rate on retained profits is, on 
average, 10 percentage points higher than the effective tax rate on interest.139 
Since the rates do not reflect behavioral responses, it is not known to what extent 
the potential distortions affect real investment (and saving) decisions (Fullerton, 
1986). A shortcoming is also that country-specific tax enforcement features are 
not captured. 
Micro backward-looking studies, based on data of corporate profits culled 
from financial statements, do not have these shortcomings. A recent study by 
Nicodème (2001) uses these data to calculate the effective tax rates of the 
manufacturing sector for 11 EU Member States.140 As shown in Table 10, 
Sweden has the lowest effective corporate tax rate (13 percent – 15 percentage 
points lower than the statutory tax rate of 28 percent) and Italy the highest (26.4 
percent – some 10 percentage points lower than the statutory tax rate). It should 
be noted, however, that the rates have been calculated on corporate profits 
including depreciation, which eliminates intercountry differences in depreciation 
schedules. Nicodème concludes that there are large differences between statutory 
and effective tax rates within as well as between Member States for different 
sectors and sizes of companies.141 As the Pearsons (correlation) coefficient of 
0.12 indicates, there is hardly any correspondence between the statutory tax rates 
and the effective tax rates of Nicodème’s study. Apparently, this cannot be 
attributed to differences in tax bases (European Commission, 2001). 
Accordingly, it suggests that the ability to use tax-planning techniques (transfer 
                                                                                                                                    
138This post-tax rate of return includes infra-marginal profits. In contrast, under marginal effective tax rates, the 
post-tax rate of return just equals the alternative market interest rate. Other studies, e.g. Baker and McKenzie 
(2001), compute the effective tax rates at a given pre-tax rate of return.  
139In addition, Devereux and Griffith (2001) calculate effective tax rates on various types of assets. It appears 
that the tax systems of the Member States tend to favor investments in intangibles and machinery over 
buildings and inventories. The spread between the effective tax rates on these assets, however, is not as great as 
the spread between retained earnings and debt. 
140This study draws on the methodology developed by Buijink, Jansen and Schols (1999). Nicodème (2001) 
makes a useful comparison of the pros and cons of the various approaches to computing effective corporate tax 
rates. See also OECD (2000a). 
141Within Member States, ‘energy and water’ and ‘transport and communications’ appear to be favored, while 
‘trade’ is taxed more highly. Furthermore, small companies appear to be favored in Austria, Portugal and 
Denmark, while the opposite is true for small companies in Sweden, Finland, Belgium and France. 
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pricing, thin capitalization) to reduce tax liabilities differs between Member 
States. 142 
Differences in effective tax rates between Member States should induce a 
relocation of real activities across the EU.143 A recent study by Gorter and Parikh 
(2000) confirms this. The authors find a (high) semi-elasticity of out-of-state 
investment within the EU of, on average, –4.3. This means that for every 1 
percentage point reduction in a Member State’s effective CT, investors from 
other Member States will, on average, increase their investment by 4.3 percent in 
that state. A comparison of this study with work on US foreign direct investment 
in the EU suggests that intra-EU investments are more sensitive to taxes than 
EU-wide inbound or outbound investments are. This testifies to the increasing 
capital mobility within the EU and accordingly the increased sensitivity of 
investments to interstate tax differentials.  
2. European Commission Proposals (Bolkestein Report) 
(a) Summary 
The differences in the effective levels of taxation between the Member States 
(computed on the basis of the Devereux/Griffith model) are one of the three 
central themes in a recent report issued by the European Commission (2001). 
Three-quarters of these differences, according to the Commission, can be 
attributed to differences in statutory tax rates.144 The differences would imply 
that investment decisions in the EU are driven, to an important extent, by tax 
considerations instead of gross (social) returns. Also, one finding is that inbound 
and outbound investments are taxed more heavily than identical domestic 
investment projects, although EU-wide corporations tend to be taxed less heavily 
than otherwise identical in-state businesses (including tax-favored small and 
medium-sized firms). 
Secondly, the Commission identifies the main provisions that hamper cross-
border economic activity and impede the creation of pan-European business 
structures. Primarily, these provisions have regard to the requirement that 
corporate profits have to be calculated (often arbitrarily) on an arm’s-length 
basis (separate accounting). This may involve double taxation if the arm’s-length 
price in one Member State is not accepted by the tax authorities in another 
Member State. Perhaps most importantly, separate accounting means that tax 
losses in one Member State cannot be offset against taxable profits of affiliated 
                                                                                                                                    
142There are few empirical studies on the extent of transfer pricing manipulation and thin capitalization in the 
EU, but see Bartelsman and Beetsma (2000) on transfer pricing. On the other hand, there is a wealth of 
empirical studies for the US (Hines, 1999), nearly all of which indicate that the phenomenon is important. 
143For a useful review of various empirical studies, also with respect to the US, see Gorter and de Mooij (2001). 
144As indicated by Table 10, there is a close correlation between the ranking of statutory and effective average 
tax rates.  
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corporations in other Member States.145 Furthermore, separate accounting 
implies the taxation of capital gains on assets transferred to other Member 
States. This means that the tax costs of cross-border mergers, acquisitions and 
internal reorganizations can be high. This jeopardizes the functioning of the 
internal market.  
Thirdly, the Commission calls attention to the high costs that businesses with 
EU-wide operations have to incur in complying with possibly 15 different CT 
regimes and to the high administrative costs that governments face in having to 
monitor the compliance.  
The Commission explores two approaches that it believes would mitigate the 
distortions, facilitate cross-border economic activity and reduce the high 
compliance and administrative costs. First, it proposes a wide range of targeted 
measures, such as an extension of the coverage of the parent–subsidiary 
directive, the merger directive and the arbitration convention, as well as the 
adoption of the interest/royalty directive and the directive on loss compensation. 
Furthermore, Member States could be encouraged to expand the programs for 
bilateral or multilateral Advance Pricing Agreements (in lieu of the ex-post 
determination of transfer prices) and improve the network of double taxation 
conventions (or perhaps negotiate a multilateral treaty conferring interpretive 
jurisdiction on the European Court of Justice). 
Secondly, the Commission examines a number of general remedial measures 
that remove obstacles to cross-border investment and consolidation of businesses 
by establishing a common tax base for EU activities. The main proposals in this 
field are Common Base Taxation (CBT) and Home State Taxation (HST).146 
Under CBT, two or more Member States would harmonize their rules for 
computing taxable profits in respect of firms with cross-border operations 
(national rules would be maintained for firms with purely domestic operations). 
Under HST, participating Member States would maintain their own profit 
determination rules, but businesses with cross-border operations would be taxed 
in the Member State in which their headquarters are located (exemplifying the 
principle of mutual recognition).147 
Under CBT as well as HST, taxable profits would be determined on the basis 
of consolidated accounts. Separate accounting by reference to arm’s-length 
pricing rules would become redundant for the participating Member States (not 
                                                                                                                                    
145Offset is possible for losses of permanent establishments whose operations are consolidated with those of the 
parent. 
146Other rather far-reaching proposals are a European CT (operating alongside national rules, revenues to be 
paid into the EU budget) and an EU-wide CT base replacing national tax bases (but to be allocated to Member 
States, which could apply their own rates). The unanimity rule, however, would make the adoption of these 
proposals unlikely. Accordingly, the Commission pays less attention to these options. For a useful summary 
and evaluation, see Weiner (2002). 
147Thus, HST resembles the Commission’s proposal for a definitive VAT regime (European Commission, 
1996a). 
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other Member States or third countries). Consolidated profits would be shared by 
the participating Member States on the basis of the weighted share in various 
economic activities of the corporation, represented by such factors as its sales, 
payroll and property (formula apportionment).148 Subsequently, Member States 
would apply their own tax rates.   
(b) Evaluation149 
No doubt, the European Commission’s report is an impressive inventory of 
options to remove obstacles to cross-border economic activity. Unfortunately, 
however, the Commission does not analyze the sensitivity of investments to tax-
induced differences in returns.150 Hence, it cannot provide an indication of the 
size of the tax-induced distortions in the internal market and thus the urgency of 
tax coordination. While various targeted remedial measures (e.g. on loss 
compensation) deserve to be implemented without delay (provided adequate 
safeguards against abuse can be found), the comprehensive measures require 
further discussion. 
Although CBT and HST would probably contribute to a reduction of cross-
border obstacles, they would also increase tax competition. Under both 
proposals, Member States will have an incentive to use rate setting more 
intensively, because the tax base cannot be used anymore to attract real 
investment. Tax competition would also increase on account of the greater 
transparency of the tax base, which cannot mask differences in effective tax rates 
anymore. Furthermore, HST would increase tax competition for headquarter 
locations, because Member States would be induced to narrow their tax bases. 
As a result, new externalities would arise, because individual Member States 
would not take into account the effect of a smaller tax base on the tax revenues 
of other Member States.151 
A second problem is that the proposals do not address the distortions of the 
various CTs within Member States on financing structures (equity vs. debt) and 
various types of investment (buildings, machinery, inventories, intangibles). The 
report notes that the variations in effective tax rates are significant and that they 
are much greater if PTs are taken into account. Distortions within Member States 
cause distortions between Member States (a point that the Commission chooses 
to ignore). Hence, the removal of formal cross-border obstacles to economic 
activity is insufficient to level the CT playing field. Indeed, as the VAT 
                                                                                                                                    
148Tax base sharing on the basis of formula apportionment is widely practiced by US states and Canadian 
provinces. 
149This subsection draws on Bovenberg, Cnossen and de Mooij (2002). 
150For an analysis of the sensitivity of foreign investments to tax differentials, see de Mooij and Ederveen 
(2001). 
151Simulations by the Commission show that HST would increase the variation in effective tax rates by more 
than 30 percent. By contrast, simulations of CBT show almost no effect on the variation in effective tax rates. 
Tax Policy in the European Union 
65 
experience indicates, the elimination of in-state distortions is a prerequisite to 
the elimination of interstate distortions.152  
HST would even exacerbate the distortions within Member States, because 
corporations owned by shareholders from different Member States but doing 
business within the same Member State face different CT regimes. This 
jeopardizes the competitive playing field between different EU firms and 
between small nationally operating businesses and multinationals. Apart from 
hampering the functioning of the internal market, it would also undermine the 
legitimacy of the Member State’s own tax system. In addition, HST and CBT 
might increase the distortions attributable to differences in effective tax rates, 
because Member States with relatively high nominal tax rates tend to have 
relatively narrow tax bases. 
Thirdly, the coexistence of two different CT systems – national and European 
– should invite tax arbitrage. Different business firms could cooperate, for 
instance, to compensate each other’s losses or to make use of more favorable tax 
rules in another Member State (under HST) or the EU regime (under CBT). 
Also, cross-border takeovers and mergers would become more attractive. Hence, 
ownership patterns would tend to be determined by tax considerations instead of 
economic costs and benefits. The tax-induced concentration of market power 
would jeopardize the functioning of the internal market and increase the pressure 
on the EU’s competition authorities. 
A fourth problem under CBT and HST concerns formula apportionment. If 
tax base sharing is based on payroll, sales and property, then the CT becomes a 
tax on these factors. This creates new distortions in the allocation of resources 
within the EU. Firms would have an incentive to shift part of their payrolls or 
business assets to Member States with low statutory tax rates, and governments 
could manipulate the relative weights of payroll and property to stimulate 
employment and investment (Goolsbee and Maydew, 2000). Furthermore, if tax 
rates continued to differ within the EU so that profit shifting remained attractive, 
a system of formula apportionment would have to be supplemented by unitary 
combination rules under which legally separate but economically integrated 
corporations were treated as a single group for tax purposes (unitary taxation). 
According to Mintz (2002) the proposals are fraught with problems, and a 
serious question arises as to whether HST or CBT is worth the effort. Most 
likely, rules will grow to limit opportunities for tax arbitrage. In some instances, 
corporations will have to deal with more than 15 tax systems. Loss compensation 
will be easier, but the dark side of the approach is that trading in losses will be 
encouraged. The treatment of foreign income earned by consolidated 
corporations will be a thorny issue, and transfer pricing and cost allocation 
                                                                                                                                    
152In this context, the removal of cross-border obstacles can be compared with the removal of border controls 
under the pre-VAT turnover taxes. The abolition of these controls was rightly seen as a necessary, yet 
insufficient, condition for free trade and free competition in product markets. 
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problems with third countries will continue to exist. Overall, Mintz believes that 
the options will result in minimal economic gains, if any at all.  
Nevertheless, harmonization of the CTs within the EU appears attractive, 
because it would eliminate tax arbitrage, reduce obstacles to doing business on 
an EU-wide basis and eliminate tax-induced distortions of the intra-EU 
allocation of capital. A basic issue in this context is whether full harmonization 
should be achieved through tax competition or tax coordination.153 The 
introduction of HST, for instance, represents harmonization through tax rate and 
tax base competition. This would jeopardize the effective taxation of capital 
income in the EU. Perhaps, therefore, the search should be for measures that 
effectively tax capital income as well as eliminate distortions of capital income 
tax systems within Member States (as a prerequisite for an efficient allocation of 
capital between Member States).154 Accordingly, an alternative scenario for 
capital income tax coordination and harmonization is sketched below. 
3. A Pragmatic Alternative 
An alternative scenario for capital income tax coordination and harmonization 
would comprise five sequential steps: (a) the introduction of dual income taxes 
(DITs) under which all capital income would be taxed once at a single rate to 
mitigate the distorting effects of current differential-rate CT+PT systems on 
corporate financial and investment policies, (b) the introduction of interest 
withholding taxes throughout the EU (or, alternatively, the treatment of interest 
on a par with dividends) to effectively tax the normal return to capital and 
mitigate incentives for thin capitalization, and (c) the approximation of CT rates 
to eliminate incentives for transfer pricing manipulation (and thin capitalization). 
Following these steps, a fresh review should be made of (d) the introduction of 
EU-wide Common Base Taxation with formula apportionment and, 
subsequently, (e) the adoption of a European CT after the EU obtains the 
legitimacy and the power to tax.  
(a) Dual Income Tax (DIT)155 
The dual income tax (DIT) is a pragmatic approach to the uniform taxation of 
capital income within Member States. In the early 1990s, DITs were introduced 
in the Nordic countries, especially Norway, Finland and Sweden (Sørensen, 
                                                                                                                                    
153Tax competition is often recommended to promote efficiency in the government sector, but for a skeptical 
view, see Sørensen (forthcoming). 
154In addition, where appropriate, it would be important to remove various obstacles to cross-border economic 
activity through targeted measures, as indicated by the European Commission (2001). 
155For a review and evaluation of the economic and technical aspects of the DIT on which this subsection 
draws, see Cnossen (1999b). For a study on the effects of the capital income tax in the Nordic countries on 
investment before the reform, see Dufwenberg, Koskenkylä and Södersten (1994). 
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1994).156 Generally, the introduction of the DIT caused few  
 
TABLE 11 
Dual Income Taxes in Norway, Finland and Sweden, 2002 
 Norway Finland Sweden 
Year of introduction 1992 1993 1991 
    
Income tax rates (%)а    
Corporate profits 28 29 28 
Other capital income 28 29 30 
Labor incomeb 28–47.5 30.5–52.5 28–56 
    
Costs of earning income 
and basic allowances 
Deductible 
at basic rate 
Deductible 
at basic rate 
Deductible 
at basic rate 
    
Basic allowance 
for capital income 
Yes No No 
    
Offset of capital income 
against labor income 
In first bracket Through tax credit 
at basic rate 
Through tax credit 
at basic rate 
    
Method of CT–PT 
integration 
Full imputation Full imputation No integration 
    
Corporation tax rates (%)    
Distributed profits 28 29 28 + 30% PT 
Retained profits 28 plus 
28% PT on capital 
gains minus net 
retained profits 
29 plus 
28% PT on  
capital gains 
28 plus 
30% PT on  
capital gains 
    
Withholding taxes (%)c    
Dividends    
 Portfolio 15 15 15 
 Direct investment 0; 10; 15 0; 10; 15 0; 10; 15 
Interest — — — 
Royalties — 0 — 
    
Net wealth tax rates (%) 0.9–1.1 0.9 1.5 
aIncluding local taxes. 
bNot including nondeductible social security contributions, which increase effective marginal tax rates. 
cTreaty countries. 
Source: International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation, European Taxation, Amsterdam, loose-leaf. 
 
                                                                                                                                    
156Over the years, Norway and Finland have adhered closely to the requirements of a pure DIT. In 1995, 
however, Sweden deviated from the original model, mainly by taxing corporate profit distributions and, along 
with Finland, retentions twice.  
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economic, political or administrative problems.157 The Austrian and Belgian 
capital income tax systems also exhibit features of the DIT. 
The main features of the Nordic dual income tax are shown in Table 11. 
These features can be summarized as follows. 
Separation of Capital and Labor Income 
All income is separated into either capital income or labor income, also called 
earned income or individual income. Capital income includes business profits 
(representing the return on equity), dividends, capital gains, interest, rents and 
rental values. Labor income consists of wages and salaries (including the value 
of labor services performed by the owner in his or her business), fringe benefits, 
pension income and social security benefits. Royalties are taxed as labor income 
or as capital income (if know-how is acquired or capitalized). 
Tax Rates 
Basically, all capital income is taxed at the proportional CT rate – 28 percent in 
Norway and 29 percent in Finland (Sweden taxes individual capital income 
somewhat higher than corporate profits) – while labor income is subject to 
additional, progressive PT rates. To minimize tax arbitrage, the tax rate on labor 
income applicable to the first income bracket is set at (approximately) the same 
level as the proportional CT rate. 
Costs of Earning Income and Allowances 
All costs of earning income and all allowances are deductible only from income 
subject to the basic or proportional tax rate. This limitation means that the tax 
benefit of mixed costs (which incorporate an element of individual consumption) 
incurred in earning income does not rise with income. But the limitation 
discriminates against wage-earners, since the self-employed can deduct their 
business costs against the top marginal tax rate on labor income.  
                                                                                                                                    
157In Sweden, however, the adoption of the DIT coincided with a deep recession (unrelated to the DIT per se).  
Agell, Englund and Södersten (1996) conclude that the limitation of interest deductibility for homeowners – the 
after-tax interest rate for an average employee increased from minus 7 percent in 1980 to plus 7 percent in 1991 
– and especially the increase in value added tax on new housing and housing maintenance of at least 10 
percentage points squeezed short-term effective demand, causing a decline in gross national product of 1 
percentage point. As these authors point out, however, over time, the Swedish reform should improve the 
efficient allocation of resources (away from durable consumer goods towards investment goods) and strengthen 
the incentives to invest in human capital.  
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Offset of Capital Income against Labor Income 
Finland and Sweden tax capital and labor income entirely separately. 
Alternatively, in Norway, the two forms of income are taxed jointly at the CT 
rate, while net labor income is subsequently taxed at additional progressive PT 
rates. Joint taxation permits the offset of negative capital income against positive 
labor income. But the same effect is achieved in Finland and Sweden by 
permitting a tax credit for capital income losses (calculated at the basic rate) 
against the tax on labor income. Furthermore, joint taxation, as in Norway, 
permits the application of joint basic allowances. Separate taxation, on the other 
hand, enables the imposition of flat source taxes, if desired, on various forms of 
capital income, as is done in Finland.158 
Avoidance of Double Taxation 
In Finland and Norway, double taxation of distributed profits at the corporate 
level and the shareholder level is avoided through a full imputation system.159 
Compensatory taxes guarantee that no dividends are paid out of exempt profits 
without having borne CT, which would subsequently be creditable against the 
shareholder’s PT. Alternatively but equivalently, double taxation can be avoided 
by exempting dividend income at the shareholder level, as Sweden used to do in 
1994.160  
Double taxation of retained profits at the corporate level in conjunction with 
the taxation of realized capital gains at the shareholder level is avoided in 
Norway by permitting shareholders to write up the basis of their shares by 
retained profits net of CT. The system is called the RISK method.161 Similarly, 
the basis is written down if losses occur or profits are distributed out of 
previously accumulated earnings. Appropriate adjustments are also made if 
capital is paid in or paid out. The first-in/first-out principle applies if part of the 
same shareholding is sold. The RISK method deals both with the danger of 
excessive distributions of retained profits and with the unwarranted exemption of 
                                                                                                                                    
158Unfortunately, separate taxation also facilitated the introduction of diverging basic labor and capital income 
tax rates in Finland and Sweden after 1995. 
159The equal treatment of retained and distributed profits was breached in Norway in 2000 when the imputation 
tax credit for dividends in excess of NOK 10,000 was reduced to 17 percent of the dividend income. 
160In the elections, however, it transpired that voters could not appreciate the equivalency between exemption 
and imputation (both with a compensatory tax at the corporate level to prevent the payment of dividends from 
untaxed profits). Hence, Sweden reverted to the double tax on distributed profits. Also, exemption would have 
made it problematic to maintain withholding taxes on dividends paid out to foreign shareholders (as a proxy for 
the domestic capital gains tax, which cannot be levied), who might invoke the nondiscrimination clause 
included in most tax treaties. Finally, exemption made it more difficult to establish eligibility for income-tested 
transfer payments. 
161RISK stands for Regulering av aksjenes Inngangsverdi med endring i Skattlagt Kapital: adjustment of basis 
by changes in capital subject to tax. 
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realized gains at shareholder level due to unrealized gains at corporate level.162 
The double tax on retained profits is mitigated in Finland (only 70 percent of 
capital gains are taxed), but fully maintained in Sweden. 
Withholding Taxes 
Single taxation of capital income can be ensured through withholding or source 
taxes at the corporate level or at the level of other entities paying interest, 
royalties or other capital income. In principle, withholding or source rates should 
be set at the level of the CT rate. Consequently, these rates could represent the 
final tax liability if capital income is taxed separately from labor income and no 
basic allowance applies. This is the case in Finland and Sweden with respect to 
interest income. However, no country imposes a withholding tax on interest or 
royalties paid to nonresidents in treaty countries. Withholding taxes are only 
imposed on dividends paid to nonresident (portfolio) shareholders.163  
Proprietorships and Closely-Held Corporations164 
In Finland and Norway, taxable profits of proprietorships and closely-held 
corporations, conventionally computed, are split into a capital income 
component and a labor income component, and these are taxed on a current 
basis.165 The capital income component is calculated by applying a presumptive 
return (the sum of the nominal interest rate plus an entrepreneurial risk premium) 
to the value of the gross assets of the business (Norway) or to equity (Finland).166 
                                                                                                                                    
162As Andersson et al. (1998) point out, the RISK method is not easy to implement. 
163It is worth noting that the net return on capital is exogenously determined in small open economies. Hence, 
these taxes (as well as the CT) influence the before-tax return on the marginal investment project that is 
necessary to provide nonresident investors their fixed after-tax return (unless the marginal investment is 
financed by debt). 
164For a detailed description and evaluation of the profit-splitting scheme, see Hagen and Sørensen (1996). This 
approach avoids most of the deferral and lock-in effects of the tax that other Member States impose on capital 
gains on substantial holdings. Also, the profit-splitting rules of the source model seem easier to administer than 
some of the tortuous and arbitrary provisions for the prevention of undertaxation of the self-employed currently 
on the statute books in countries without a DIT. For a different view, see Sørensen (1994) who has labeled the 
compulsory profit-splitting rules the Achilles heel of the DIT. 
165This is referred to as the ‘source’ model of income-splitting. Under the ‘fence’ model, in Sweden, labor 
income retained in the business is taxed at the capital income tax rate. Profits are split, however, upon 
subsequent withdrawal or when a capital gain is realized on the shares of an active shareholder. The fence 
model tends to favor the self-employed over wage-earners and produces the familiar lock-in effect. 
166Basically, the gross method minimizes tax arbitrage and hence complexity, because the presumptive return is 
applied to a base – i.e. the business’s total assets – that is not influenced by the financing structure of the 
business. The net (equity) method, on the other hand, is more conducive to investment neutrality, because it 
does not encourage debt-financed investments if the government sets the presumptive rate of return above the 
going interest rate. 
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Residual profits are considered as labor income.167 The reason for determining 
capital income first is that the appropriate return on labor is difficult to estimate, 
because diligence, effort and ingenuity may diverge widely, as may the hourly 
wage rate relating to various kinds of labor and the number of hours worked. 
Moreover, if labor income were to be determined first, the marginal PT rate on 
the profits of the self-employed and active shareholders would exhibit a 
regressive incidence. Additional earnings would then be taxed at the proportional 
CT rate instead of the progressive PT rate. 
Net Wealth Tax 
Optionally, the progressivity of the burden distribution of the capital income tax 
can be increased through the net wealth tax, which is levied in Norway, Finland 
and Sweden. This tax also implies that residents are taxed differentially higher 
than nonresidents. 
(b) Interest Withholding Taxes 
The goal of ensuring single taxation under current DITs, however, is mostly 
honored in the breach with respect to interest (and royalty) payments to exempt 
entities, such as pension funds, and foreign debtholders (or suppliers of know-
how). The absence of a withholding tax on interest paid to foreign debtholders 
leaves opportunities intact for evading or avoiding the CT or DIT on interest 
income by foreign as well as domestic debtholders.168 This hole in the CT bucket 
can only be plugged by imposing a withholding tax at the CT rate on all interest 
– in effect, treating interest on a par with dividend income, which is taxed only at 
                                                                                                                                    
167Both Finland and Norway mitigate the tax burden on labor-intensive firms, basically by allocating a 
specified percentage of labor income – 10 percent of the payroll in Finland, 11 percent in Norway – to the 
capital income component of the DIT. 
168The following discussion assumes that policy-makers wish to tax interest or, more generally, the normal 
return to capital. Accordingly, proposals for a cash-flow tax or an allowance for corporate equity (ACE) are not 
reviewed. Under a cash-flow tax, corporations would be denied a deduction for interest as well as dividends 
paid (if not already denied), but they would be allowed an immediate write-off of the cost of business assets. As 
a result, the return on marginal investments, just making a viable economic return, would be exempted. See 
McLure and Zodrow (1996) for arguments why taxation on cash flow has economic and administrative 
advantages over a conventional income tax. Under the ACE system, conceived by Boadway and Bruce (1984) 
but given hands and feet by the IFS Capital Taxes Group (1991), an allowance for corporate equity, equal to the 
risk-free rate of interest (Bond and Devereux, 1995), in computing taxable profits would be provided. Until 
recently, a form of ACE was in use in Croatia, where it was called the interest-adjusted income tax (IAIT) 
(Rose and Wiswesser, 1998). For a discussion of the system and of criticisms leveled against it, see Keen and 
King (2002). The taxation of new corporate equity in Italy at the lower rate of 19 percent may be said to 
resemble an ACE-type system. Under the Italian approach, however, debt is still subsidized through the tax 
system and corporations have a strong incentive to convert old equity into ‘new’ equity. For a review and 
evaluation, see Bordignon, Gianninni and Panteghini (2001). Whatever the merits of cash-flow taxation or 
ACE systems, it should be pointed out that taxes on non-country-specific economic rents would still require tax 
policy coordination in the EU if location decisions are not to be affected. 
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the corporate level. Arrangements could then be made under which tax withheld 
at business level would be creditable in residence Member States (hence, capital 
income could be taxed at different rates by those Member States). Alternatively, 
the tax withheld would not be creditable but constitute the final liability in the 
source state (which would require approximation of tax rates if investment 
location decisions were not to be distorted). 
Final, source-based, withholding taxes on interest would make the DIT 
equivalent to a comprehensive business income tax (CBIT). This tax, proposed 
by the US Department of the Treasury (1992), proceeds from the fundamental 
equivalence between a CT levied at source and an equal-rate PT on corporate 
earnings with full credit for the underlying CT. Accordingly, no deductions are 
allowed, at corporate level, for dividends and interest paid to shareholders and 
debtholders, while these income items are not taxed at the level of the recipients, 
be they individuals or corporations, exempt entities or nonresidents. This makes 
the debt–equity distinction irrelevant and greatly reduces the distinction between 
retained and distributed earnings (depending on the treatment of capital gains).169 
The CBIT can be introduced while largely maintaining the present rules for 
determining taxable profits, including those applicable to depreciation and 
inventory accounting. Exempt entities and nonresidents would be treated the 
same as resident individuals or corporations. They would not be eligible for a 
refund of the CBIT, nor would they have to pay any additional CBIT in the form 
of a withholding tax or otherwise. Corporations receiving CBIT income as 
dividends or interest would also not be taxed on such income. To ensure that 
dividends and interest are not paid out of exempt earnings, a compensatory tax 
(already in place under various imputation systems in the EU) should be levied 
on exempt income (made available for distribution as dividends or interest).170 
Capital gains on shares would only be taxed to the extent that they exceed the 
acquisition cost stepped up by the corporation’s retained profits net of the CT. 
As a point of immediate policy relevance, the introduction of a single source-
based tax on dividends and interest under CBIT or DIT implies that the parent–
subsidiary directive should be welcomed, because it eliminates an undesirable 
extra layer of tax, but that the draft interest/royalty directive should not be 
adopted, because it prohibits a desired single layer of tax. 
The main problem of the DIT (final) withholding tax on interest and the 
CBIT is that they would raise capital costs, because the normal return on capital, 
even if received by exempt entities and nonresidents, would be implicitly taxed. 
Although this would seem a goal worth pursuing, gradual and concerted action is 
called for. Caution is advisable because the current tax-induced changes in 
                                                                                                                                    
169The CBIT differs from a cash-flow tax in that assets are depreciated over their lifetime, as they would be 
under a conventional income tax. Hence, the normal return on capital is taxed. 
170The US Department of the Treasury (1992) advocates imposing the compensatory tax on foreign-source 
income too, while retaining current foreign tax credit rules. To avoid double taxation, this should not, of 
course, be done in the EU, where the exemption method would apply to foreign-source income. 
Tax Policy in the European Union 
73 
corporate financing patterns may, to a large extent, serve to reduce the 
distortions of real investment and saving decisions. Higher before-tax rates, 
moreover, would dampen (debt-financed) investment demand. Coordination with 
the US and Japan would be essential in order to prevent tax-induced capital 
outflows due to the higher cost of capital in the EU.  
(c) Approximation of CT Rates 
The exemption of dividend income at the personal level and the taxation of 
interest income at source should reduce the need for concerted tax harmonization 
at the central EU level. The problem of thin capitalization and the lack of 
external neutrality of the imputation system would be solved. In fact, the 
schemes for CT–PT integration would become redundant. Manipulation of 
transfer prices, however, could still affect the allocation of the corporate tax base 
across Member States. To limit this form of tax arbitrage, a minimum rate, as 
proposed by the Ruding Committee, would have to be agreed to. Presumably, 
rate approximation would be easier to achieve following the introduction of 
DITs and interest withholding taxes. 
 
(d) Common Base Taxation? 
 
DIT and CBIT would still proceed from the separate-accounting approach in 
determining the taxable profits of affiliated corporations in different Member 
States. Provisions for the removal of cross-border obstacles to economic activity 
and business restructuring, therefore, would still be needed. As pointed out by 
the European Commission (2001), a comprehensive solution to these problems, 
if desired, can only be achieved through Common Base Taxation. The 
advantages of Common Base Taxation with formula apportionment (and its 
logical conclusion, unitary taxation) are fewer distortions, less tax arbitrage and 
lower compliance costs. But the path to Common Base Taxation would not be 
easy. Its introduction would give rise to serious policy-sequencing and transition 
problems for EU Member States. Accounting conventions and institutional 
structures would have to be harmonized. All of these problems would be 
exacerbated by complex technical questions, such as defining a unitary business, 
choosing the apportionment formula and measuring the factors in the formula. 
Last but not least, tax autonomy would suffer, although some room for 
independent policy-making would remain by permitting Member States to 
choose their own tax rate within an agreed range. 
In a recent contribution, McLure and Weiner (2000) make clear that formula 
apportionment is conceptually inferior to separate accounting if separate 
accounting can be applied. In contrast with reality, formula apportionment 
assumes, for instance, that profitability is uniform across related corporations 
operating in different Member States. Furthermore, the application of uniform 
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formulas to all industries, although very different in terms of production 
technology and financial structures, could create inequities and distortions. 
Beyond that, the adoption of unitary taxation may complicate relations with non-
EU countries.  
Furthermore, according to McLure and Weiner (2000), formula 
apportionment must face the demonstrated reluctance of Member States to cede 
corporate tax issues to the central level. They believe that substantial variation is 
likely to remain a permanent feature of CT systems in the EU. In light of this, it 
is not surprising that these authors stop short of giving a definitive answer to the 
question of whether it makes policy sense to adopt formula apportionment. 
Instead, they conclude with what the EU should not do if it decides to adopt 
formula apportionment. First, if wide variations in tax rates continue to exist, 
formula apportionment should not be introduced without unitary combination. 
Secondly, formula apportionment should be limited to the water’s edge of the 
EU and not be applied on a worldwide basis. Thirdly, there should be substantial 
conformity in definitions of tax bases, apportionment rules, measures of 
apportionment factors and definitions of a unitary business. Fourthly, the only 
way to make a move to unitary taxation, if one is to be made, is multilaterally, by 
all Member States. 
 
(e) A European CT? 
  
EU-wide unitary taxation will only fully reduce distortions and compliance costs 
if applied by a joint administration under a common code uniformly interpreted 
by the European Court of Justice.171 Indeed, Common Base Taxation would 
probably not be possible without these conditions. Accordingly, the logical 
conclusion of the tax coordination and tax harmonization steps outlined above 
would be a European CT whose revenue would either be shared by the Member 
States on the basis of some formula or flow into the EU's budget. A truly 
European CT, however, would require fundamental changes in the EU's 
constitution moving it in the direction of a federal (tax) system. For the time 
being, this seems a bridge too far.  
VII. HOW MUCH TAX COORDINATION? 
This section summarizes the main findings of this review and dwells briefly on 
the question of how much tax coordination is required. 
                                                                                                                                    
171Of course, even then it would be important to heed the rule that all capital income should be taxed only once 
and at a uniform rate.  
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1. Summary 
As economic integration within the EU progresses, the interactions between the 
tax systems of the Member States are of growing importance. In all Member 
States, tax (and expenditure) systems persuasively influence economic activities. 
In the EU, the combined tax burden of the Member States is 42.5 percent of the 
EU’s GDP compared with a US tax burden of 29.4 percent. In particular, taxes 
on labor (including taxes on consumption) are very high – 36 percent of GDP 
(against 20 percent in the US).  
The political tax setting in the EU contains elements of both the ‘independent 
nation state’ and the ‘federal system.’ The three main criteria that may be 
applied to the design of tax policy in this setting are jurisdiction, distortion and 
enforcement. Jurisdiction or ‘subsidiarity’ is central to the Treaty of Maastricht; 
generally it means that the power to tax rests with the Member States. Distortion, 
the leitmotif of the Treaty of Rome, implies that taxes should be levied without 
unduly interfering with trade and investment. The taxes under review can be 
broadly categorized in taxes on consumption, labor and capital. 
(a) Taxes on Consumption 
Generally, the VAT, is very suitable for Member State use. Consumers, and 
hence the consumption tax base, tend to be rather immobile. Sensitivity to inter-
Member-State rate differences is low. Cross-border shopping diminishes rapidly 
with the distance that has to be traveled and rate differences are unlikely to affect 
interstate resource allocation. Furthermore, the VAT is relatively difficult to 
avoid or evade on account of the interlocking audit trail (for in-state 
transactions) and reporting checks (for out-of-state transactions) it provides. 
Administrative duplication arises because firms with EU-wide sales must deal 
with 15 different VAT administrations.  
There are few serious jurisdictional problems under VAT. The tax is levied in 
the Member State of final sale (a close proxy for consumption). Cross-border 
shopping attracts a great deal of attention, but in terms of overall impact – on 
local merchants, manufacturing location decisions and revenue – the 
phenomenon is not significant. The incentive for cross-border shopping 
diminishes rapidly with the distance that has to be traveled to buy goods in other 
Member States. Consequently, rate approximation between Member States 
seems quite unnecessary. Services – including digitized content transmitted over 
the Internet, which, not being goods, are classified as services – present a 
problem, however, because modern technology makes many services both 
mobile and location-free.  
Distortion under the VAT comes mainly from the exemption of healthcare 
and education, cultural services, immovable property, finance, insurance, and not 
to forget public sector activities. A strong case can be made, therefore, for taxing 
these services – at a zero rate perhaps if externalities arise. This would eliminate 
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input distortions, put exports on a more neutral footing and induce exempt 
institutions to keep an eye on cost minimization – the corollary of profit 
maximization in the marketplace. Contracting-out (privatization) of various in-
house services, such as laundry, cleaning, food preparation and administration, 
would become more attractive. In eliminating unwarranted exemptions, the EU 
Member States can learn much from newcomers to the VAT – New Zealand, 
Canada and Australia. These countries follow best practice by taxing all of the 
services that are exempt in the EU except residential rents and rental values, 
finance, insurance and primary education. 
Enforcement is made quite an issue by the European Commission which 
believes in the no-break-in-the-VAT-chain doctrine. Allegedly, the current 
transitional regime under which cross-border supplies within the EU are zero-
rated creates a no man’s land outside VAT control. Various alternatives, all 
destination-based, that would not break the VAT chain have been proposed by 
the European Commission and in the tax literature. The problem with the 
proposals, however, is that they do not make clear the shortcomings of the 
deferred payment scheme (called the transitional regime) that is currently in 
place. By all accounts, the regime works satisfactorily. What should be 
abolished, however, are the statistical obligations for cross-border supplies 
within the EU. Following the introduction of the euro, these obligations (not 
applicable to services, anyway, and meaningless for intercompany transactions) 
have lost much of their relevance.  
Enforcement considerations loom large with respect to the ‘sin’ taxes: excises 
on drinking, smoking, driving, polluting and gambling. Cigarettes and alcohol 
are taxed at widely differing effective rates. Consequently, bootlegging (tax-base 
snatching) is a serious problem. Further policy and administrative coordination 
would raise additional excise revenue which could be used to reduce other more 
distortionary taxes. This does not apply to motor vehicle taxes, which can be tied 
to taxpayers’ residences. 
(b) Taxes on Labor  
Distortion, not jurisdiction or enforcement, is the main problem with taxes on 
labor. Of all markets, the labor market is probably the most distorted in the EU. 
Low participation and high unemployment are a waste of human potential and 
national product. Total average and marginal tax rates on labor, represented by 
the OECD’s average production worker (APW), are extremely high. Economic 
models indicate that switches in the tax burden away from labor to consumption, 
capital and energy – advocated by the European Commission – hardly affect 
participation rates, because, in the main, these taxes are also borne by labor. 
Rather, it is the interaction between taxes, social benefits and labor market 
regulations that depresses labor supply and demand. There is an ‘iron law’ that 
labor market incentives cannot be reconciled with ‘adequate’ income support 
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systems. This suggests that the trade-off between in-work benefits (which creates 
the poverty trap) and out-of-work replacement rates (which creates the 
unemployment trap) should be reviewed. This trade-off is acute among low-
income earners, but it is also inherent in many disability and early-retirement 
schemes. 
The main lesson, not new, from this review is that Member States should 
solve their own labor market problems, including those that arise from the 
interaction of taxes, social benefits and regulations (another form of taxation). 
Involvement of the central EU level would most likely exacerbate existing 
distortions. Another lesson is that the tax system cannot solve and should not be 
used to cover up the failures of the social security system.  
(c) Taxes on Capital 
Jurisdiction (and enforcement) are problematic issues under corporation taxes 
(CTs). Because tax entitlement is based on the source or territoriality principle, 
profits must be accounted for separately per Member State. This means that 
transactions between related firms must be valued on the basis of the arm’s-
length principle – comparable prices determined in open markets. But the arm’s-
length principle is not much of a principle if prices cannot be determined at 
arm’s length even if all the facts are known. In theory, there is no answer to the 
question of where the profits of a pharmaceutical company accrue if a drug is 
invented in France, produced in Italy and consumed in Spain. Per force, the 
division of the company’s profits must be made arbitrarily. Furthermore, 
distortions arise because nearly all Member States tax different forms of capital 
income at widely varying rates. Within Member States, these differences 
interfere with financing and investment decisions. Debt is favored over equity 
and institutional investors over individual investors. Between Member States, the 
differences create production distortions. In addition, various cross-border 
obstacles to investment and business restructuring exist.  
The European Commission (2001) has reviewed a large number of targeted 
and comprehensive measures to eliminate cross-border obstacles. Targeted 
remedial measures would extend the scope of the (draft) directives on cross-
border dividend, interest and royalty payments, mergers and provisions for loss 
compensation. Comprehensive measures are designed to remove cross-border 
obstacles by introducing a single tax base for corporations with cross-border 
operations (Home State Taxation) or a common tax base for two or more 
Member States (Common Base Taxation). It is doubtful, however, whether the 
comprehensive measures would reduce tax distortion, arbitrage and complexity. 
According to one astute observer (Mintz, 2002), the proposals are fraught with 
problems, and a serious question arises as to whether Home State Taxation or 
Common Base Taxation are worth the effort. 
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Accordingly, an alternative approach to coordinating capital income taxes in 
the EU is sketched. The centerpiece of this approach is a dual income tax (DIT) 
as found in the Nordic countries which taxes all capital income at a single, 
uniform rate, i.e. the CT rate. The DIT seems an appropriate model for the EU 
Member States for three reasons. First, the DIT eliminates the distortions and 
arbitrage problems that attend the current differential taxation of capital income 
across sectors, assets and modes of finance. Generally, double taxation of 
distributed and retained profits is (or can be) avoided. Secondly, the DIT does 
not raise capital costs outright, because interest paid to tax-exempts and 
nonresidents is not taxed. Yet the DIT leaves the door open to taxing the normal 
return to capital more fully through EU-wide and international tax policy 
coordination. Thirdly, by separating capital income from labor income, the 
capital income tax rate under the DIT is not made hostage to the (higher) tax rate 
on labor income. Hence, the capital income tax rate becomes an additional tax 
policy instrument for governments, because the rate can be lowered (or raised) 
more easily in response to growing tax mobility and tax competition (or tax 
coordination). 
Under the DIT, full neutrality will not be achieved unless a withholding tax is 
imposed on interest (and royalties) at source. This would convert the DIT into a 
comprehensive business income tax (CBIT) if the withholding tax were not 
creditable in residence countries. This source-based tax would require tax rate 
approximation if investment location decisions were not to be distorted.172 
Agreement on a (minimum) CT rate would reduce the incentive for profit-
shifting to low-tax jurisdictions. However, such a tax would leave separate 
accounting and the attendant cross-border obstacles to economic activity intact. 
The tax costs of separate accounting can only be reduced through the 
introduction of Common Base Taxation on an EU-wide basis accompanied by a 
system of formula apportionment (with unitary combination). The adoption of a 
truly European CT whose revenue would flow into the EU’s budget will have to 
wait until the EU acquires the legitimacy and the power to tax.  
2. How Much Tax Coordination? 
This summary has highlighted various issues regarding jurisdiction, distortion 
and enforcement but has not indicated the extent to which Member States should 
coordinate their tax systems. This is because there are important trade-offs 
between efficiency and subsidiarity. The economist can highlight these trade-offs 
and estimate the costs of alternative courses of action, but the body politic has to 
decide on the exact nature and extent of the trade-offs. The following prominent 
strands of thought illuminate the debate. 
                                                                                                                                    
172Paraphrasing Slemrod (1995), an EU featuring equal-rate source-based capital income taxes would be more 
efficient than an EU featuring fully enforced residence-based taxes (if feasible of implementation) only, 
because the cost of enforcement is lower for the system of source-based taxes.  
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To begin with, the choice of the trade-offs depends on the route to tax 
integration that is followed. As Kay (1993) has pointed out, there is integration 
through harmonization and integration through competition. In the first of these 
approaches – which he calls the Bismarckian approach – the creation of the 
internal market requires prior alignment of the tax policies and practices of the 
Member States. Under the second – the Jeffersonian approach – the mechanism 
of choice is to promote integration at all deliberate speed and to let the 
consequences for the tax rules follow from that. In essence, the choice is 
between prescription and adaptation, a choice that has deep historic roots in 
Europe.  
In the spirit of the Jeffersonian approach, Bird (1989) has noted that there are 
two related but quite separate dimensions of integration, the economic and the 
political (as expressed by, among others, tax integration). His review of the 
actual situation in six federations and the [EU] common market shows that there 
is no single continuum between the economic and the political or tax dimension. 
In practice, economic union can exist quite separately without much political or 
tax integration. As he states provocatively, ‘economic union is not a degenerate 
case of federalism’. Further, he continues: ‘[j]ust as in federations, identical tax 
systems may be neither necessary nor desirable in a common market in which 
member states have different policy objectives and different economic 
conditions’. In his view, the ‘differential’ approach instead of the ‘equalization’ 
approach seems most appropriate in principle. 
Based upon a careful examination of the fiscal history of five confederations, 
Mihajek (1998) argues, furthermore, that political integration is not a necessary 
consequence of monetary integration. Confederations have the advantage that 
they enable Member States to reap most of the benefits of economic integration, 
while still allowing them to exercise independent powers in key areas of policy-
making. Applied to the EU, there would be little role for an allocation function 
of the center in an economic union.173 Furthermore, the redistribution function 
would be limited to regional aid made necessary on account of the limited 
effective mobility of labor. The stabilization function, finally, can be exercised 
through a cooperative approach that establishes rules limiting the size of 
Member States’ budget deficits and government debt.174 
The contrast between tax harmonization, which may reduce economic 
distortions, and tax competition, which may reduce political distortions, is 
explored by Frey and Eichenberger (1996). The authors argue that the strong 
bias in favor of tax harmonization weakens resistance against increases in 
taxation because ‘exit does not help and protest (voice) is less attractive because 
                                                                                                                                    
173Mention should be made, however, of the wide range of regulatory powers of the European Union 
concerning technical, environmental, safety and health standards which, exercised by the Member States 
themselves, could all be used to interfere with free trade and competition. 
174Implicitly, this assumes that economic integration limits the occurrence and size of asymmetric economic 
shocks. 
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everyone is affected equally ...’. To combat the tax harmonization cartel, the 
‘rules of the game’ should be changed, in their view, through the wider use of 
popular referendums and the introduction of functional, overlapping, competing 
jurisdictions. An incidental, if welcome, side effect of these new rules would be 
that economic distortions would also be reduced. Or, in McLure’s (1986) words, 
what’s good for the private goose should also be good for the public gander. 
A common thread in these findings and analyses is that a gradualist approach 
should be preferred over an holistic approach. As the earlier US political 
experience indicated, blueprints are divisive, primarily because they are not the 
outcome of a process in which all parties have participated in an open and well-
informed manner. Accordingly, great weight should be attached to devising 
processes in which participants have an equal chance of influencing the results, 
rather than to the results themselves. Tax-policy-makers should be advised to 
grapple for incremental changes in existing fiscal institutions that are acceptable, 
workable and an improvement. This means that tax coordination will continue to 
be a slow, arduous process – two steps forward, one step back. But this is no 
reason for despair (in fact, it is the way we dance). The EU has often been 
compared to a tortoise that never seems to move but that has covered a 
remarkable amount of ground since its birth in the late 1950s. 
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